Russia at War: Chechnya, Georgia, and Theories of Foreign Policy by Pack, Tyler J.
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
All Graduate Plan B and other Reports Graduate Studies 
5-2011 
Chechnya, Georgia, and Theories of Foreign Policy 
Tyler J. Pack 
Utah State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports 
 Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pack, Tyler J., "Chechnya, Georgia, and Theories of Foreign Policy" (2011). All Graduate Plan B and other 
Reports. 10. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/10 
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Plan B and 
other Reports by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please 
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu. 
Russia	  at	  War:	  
Chechnya,	  Georgia,	  and	  Theories	  of	  Foreign	  Policy	  
By	  
Tyler	  J.	  Pack	  
A	  Plan	  B	  Thesis	  submitted	  in	  partial	  fulfillment	  of	  
the	  requirements	  for	  the	  degree	  of	  
	  












David	  Goetze	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Veronica	  Ward	  
Major	  Professor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Committee	  Member	  
	  
________________________	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ________________________	  
























The	  conflicts	  in	  Chechnya	  and	  Georgia	  are	  for	  Russia	  the	  seminal	  policy	  events	  of	  the	  
turbulent	  post-­‐Soviet	  era.	  Learning	  about	  Russian	  conflict	  policy	  thinking	  with	  respect	  to	  these	  
cases	  should	  help	  to	  illuminate	  broader	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  objectives	  and	  tendencies.	  Even	  
though	  the	  Chechen	  Wars	  were	  by	  nature	  domestic	  conflicts,	  I	  believe	  that	  trends	  and	  patterns	  
from	  that	  case,	  combined	  with	  insights	  from	  the	  Georgian	  conflict,	  can	  help	  identify	  strengths	  
and	  weaknesses	  of	  major	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  theories.	  	  
Though	  there	  are	  many	  such	  theories,	  I	  see	  that	  most	  fall	  into	  one	  of	  two	  broad	  
categories.	  While	  there	  is	  some	  overlap,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  major	  theories	  of	  Russian	  foreign	  
policy	  ascribe	  policy	  decisions	  either	  to	  historical	  narratives	  and	  trends	  or	  current	  events	  and	  
context.	  Within	  the	  framework	  of	  past	  events,	  I	  will	  consider	  two	  theories	  of	  Russian	  foreign	  
policy:	  the	  historical	  continuity	  theory	  and	  the	  imposed	  insecurity	  theory.	  When	  looking	  at	  
policy	  decisions	  stemming	  more	  from	  current	  happenings,	  I	  will	  also	  look	  at	  two	  important	  
theories,	  the	  diversionary	  tension	  theory	  and	  the	  economic	  enabling	  theory.	  Information	  from	  
my	  two	  cases	  can	  help	  us	  assess	  the	  general	  validity	  of	  each	  of	  the	  theories,	  or	  alternately,	  help	  
us	  grasp	  the	  contingent	  applicability	  of	  the	  theories.	  No	  one	  theory	  may	  be	  able	  to	  adequately	  
fit	  or	  explain	  all	  important	  events.	  What	  features	  of	  foreign	  policy	  events	  invoke	  one	  or	  the	  
other	  distinctive	  patterns	  of	  foreign	  policy	  practice?	  I	  begin	  by	  considering	  these	  theories	  of	  
Russian	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  then	  consider	  how	  well	  each	  theory	  fits	  each	  conflict.	  Then	  I	  explore	  
whether	  conditions	  exist	  in	  the	  two	  cases	  that	  invoke	  distinctive	  foreign	  policy	  patterns.	  
One	  caveat:	  these	  theories	  often	  imply	  a	  unitary	  actor	  assumption	  for	  Russian	  foreign	  
policy	  goals,	  strategy,	  and	  implementation.	  This	  assumption	  can	  dangerously	  simplify	  a	  theory	  if	  
it	  is	  taken	  too	  far.	  Foreign	  policy	  decisions	  in	  Russia	  have	  traditionally	  fallen	  to	  the	  executive	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branch,	  but	  today,	  the	  division	  between	  the	  duties	  of	  President	  Medvedev	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  
Putin	  is	  not	  always	  clear.	  There	  are	  other	  interested	  parties	  in	  play	  as	  well.	  Competing	  factions,	  
opinions,	  and	  goals	  make	  it	  unwise	  to	  make	  such	  bold	  statements	  as	  “Russia	  wants”	  as	  if	  there	  
is	  a	  monolithic,	  unified	  entity	  in	  charge	  of	  policy.	  Statements	  of	  “Russia’s”	  desires	  or	  goals	  in	  
this	  paper	  should	  be	  understood	  under	  the	  unitary	  actor	  framework	  that	  these	  theories	  often	  
include	  or	  imply,	  with	  all	  the	  attendant	  limitations.	  This	  approach	  serves	  a	  useful	  purpose	  in	  
making	  each	  theory	  manageable	  for	  study	  and	  discussion	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  paper.	  	  	  
Theories	  of	  Russian	  Foreign	  Policy:	  A	  Brief	  Overview	  
1.	   The	  historical	  continuity	  theory	  of	  Russian	  foreign	  policy,	  advocated	  most	  strongly	  by	  
Richard	  Pipes	  in	  the	  1990s,	  “sees	  deep	  continuities	  running	  through	  and	  even	  largely	  
determining	  the	  course	  of	  Russian	  history	  from	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  through	  the	  tsarist	  empire	  and	  
the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  present”	  (Lieven	  1998:5).	  A	  derivation	  of	  the	  theory	  holds	  
that	  the	  aggressive,	  expansionist,	  and	  imperialist	  tendencies	  of	  the	  Russian	  people	  and	  culture	  
are	  primordial	  and	  deeply	  ingrained,	  and	  that	  foreign	  policy	  actions	  of	  Russian	  leaders	  will	  
necessarily	  take	  this	  form.	  
	   The	  influence	  of	  past	  events	  on	  current	  policy	  could	  stem	  from	  many	  sources.	  Historical	  
conflicts	  could	  have	  engendered	  feelings	  of	  hostility	  between	  Russians	  and	  other	  groups	  that	  
persist	  to	  this	  day,	  still	  negatively	  affecting	  policy	  decisions	  made	  involving	  that	  outside	  group.	  
Even	  if	  such	  feelings	  might	  not	  persist	  naturally,	  elites	  can	  use	  images	  or	  stereotypes	  from	  past	  
conflicts	  to	  induce	  polarization	  and	  influence	  current	  policy.	  Another	  possibility	  is	  a	  form	  of	  
path	  dependence,	  with	  past	  Russian	  policy	  choices	  constraining	  (though	  not	  directly	  
determining)	  present	  decisions.	  One	  unique	  feature	  of	  the	  historical	  continuity	  theory,	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regardless	  of	  its	  approach,	  is	  its	  exclusive	  application	  to	  Russian	  foreign	  policy.	  Unlike	  the	  other	  
theories	  presented	  in	  this	  paper,	  this	  theory	  is	  not	  generalizable	  or	  applicable	  to	  any	  other	  
country’s	  policy	  choices.	  Of	  course,	  other	  countries’	  policy	  might	  be	  driven	  or	  influenced	  by	  
analogous	  historical	  events	  or	  narratives	  in	  their	  own	  past,	  but	  this	  theory	  based	  on	  Russian	  
history	  can	  obviously	  only	  apply	  to	  Russia	  itself.	  
	   The	  distance	  of	  such	  events	  from	  the	  present	  makes	  them	  more	  or	  less	  suitable	  for	  the	  
various	  applications	  or	  understandings	  of	  historical	  continuity.	  Events	  that	  occurred	  hundreds	  
of	  years	  ago	  are	  unlikely	  to	  still	  be	  influencing	  Russian	  policy	  through	  path	  dependency,	  as	  far	  
too	  many	  intervening	  events	  and	  years	  exist	  to	  squarely	  pin	  current	  policy	  on	  past	  decisions.	  
Events	  that	  distant	  also	  are	  unlikely	  to	  remain	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  the	  public	  consciousness	  unless	  
the	  memory,	  symbolism,	  or	  stereotypes	  that	  arise	  from	  such	  events	  are	  consciously	  invoked	  by	  
leaders	  or	  the	  public	  to	  maintain	  their	  salience.	  	  
	   In	  any	  of	  its	  forms,	  historical	  continuity	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  amorphous	  and	  difficult	  
theory	  to	  evaluate,	  because	  even	  if	  this	  were	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  modern	  Russian	  foreign	  
policy,	  the	  theory	  does	  not	  enumerate	  specific	  policy	  goals	  that	  the	  Russian	  leadership	  would	  
seek	  under	  this	  theory.	  Instead,	  we	  are	  given	  the	  entire	  scope	  of	  Russian	  history	  and	  told	  to	  find	  
similarities,	  as	  the	  threads	  of	  events	  in	  the	  past	  will	  help	  predict	  current	  behavior.	  This	  makes	  
for	  a	  very	  general,	  malleable	  theory	  that	  may	  not	  be	  falsifiable,	  as	  almost	  any	  modern	  event	  can	  
be	  tied	  to	  a	  historical	  parallel	  of	  one	  kind	  or	  another.	  The	  only	  behaviors	  that	  the	  theory	  
predicts	  very	  concretely	  are	  aggressive	  Russian	  actions	  on	  its	  borders,	  often	  in	  defense	  of	  
Russian	  interests	  or	  peoples	  seen	  as	  intrinsically	  connected	  to	  the	  Russians.	  This	  causes	  an	  
overlap	  with	  the	  imposed	  insecurity	  theory,	  which	  I	  will	  discuss	  shortly.	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Anatol	  Lieven	  discounts	  primordial	  aggression	  as	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  
events	  in	  Russian	  history	  but	  explains	  the	  rationale	  of	  its	  supporters.	  Russia	  has	  always	  been	  a	  
nation	  besieged,	  either	  literally	  or	  in	  its	  own	  perception.	  Surrounded	  by	  potentially	  hostile	  
nations	  on	  all	  sides,	  the	  only	  way	  Russia	  felt	  it	  could	  survive	  was	  to	  establish	  buffer	  zones	  
between	  itself	  and	  its	  enemies.	  The	  lack	  of	  easily	  defensible	  frontiers	  led	  Russia	  to	  use	  Ukraine,	  
Poland,	  and	  during	  the	  Soviet	  era,	  its	  Eastern	  European	  satellite	  nations	  to	  deter	  foreign	  
aggression	  and	  insulate	  the	  Russian	  homeland	  (Mankoff	  2009:2).	  Similar	  actions	  were	  taken	  
along	  the	  southern	  border	  of	  the	  Russian	  state	  among	  the	  tribes	  and	  empires	  of	  Central	  Asia.	  
Shifting	  borders	  often	  led	  to	  Russian	  populations	  living	  behind	  “enemy”	  lines,	  and	  led	  to	  a	  
historic	  desire	  by	  Russia	  to	  defend	  its	  people	  even	  if	  such	  defense	  required	  ignoring	  or	  flaunting	  
international	  borders.	  Though	  studying	  historical	  continuities	  stretching	  back	  nearly	  a	  thousand	  
years	  to	  find	  parallels	  in	  modern	  Russian	  history	  would	  take	  volumes,	  it	  may	  be	  worthwhile	  to	  
consider	  how	  Russia	  views	  its	  own	  history.	  
One	  way	  to	  examine	  Russia’s	  view	  of	  its	  own	  history	  would	  be	  a	  content	  analysis	  of	  two	  
forms	  of	  media	  that	  are	  currently	  influencing	  the	  Russian	  population:	  political	  speeches	  and	  
current	  Russian	  History	  textbooks	  used	  in	  the	  Russian	  primary	  education	  system.	  Both	  of	  these	  
are	  places	  for	  the	  Russian	  government	  to	  affect	  public	  opinion.	  If	  either	  specific	  historical	  
events	  or	  more	  general	  trends	  in	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  history	  are	  touted,	  referenced,	  or	  alluded	  
to,	  it	  may	  show	  a	  desire	  by	  the	  current	  administration	  to	  mold	  the	  historical	  record	  to	  facilitate	  
an	  expansionist,	  aggressive	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  by	  instilling	  certain	  historical	  narratives	  in	  the	  
Russian	  population.	  If	  such	  narratives	  enable	  Russian	  aggression	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  defensive,	  
justified,	  or	  appropriate	  (by	  Russians,	  if	  not	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world),	  then	  the	  resulting	  foreign	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policy	  practices	  coupled	  with	  prevailing	  narratives	  could	  certainly	  appear	  to	  be	  primordial,	  or	  at	  
least	  drawn	  from	  the	  past.	  Whether	  or	  not	  primordial	  aggression	  exists	  in	  the	  Russian	  culture,	  
the	  theme	  of	  using	  other	  nations	  as	  proxies	  to	  achieve	  greater	  goals	  will	  resurface	  in	  other	  
theories	  of	  Russian	  foreign	  policy.	  	  
Instead	  of	  attempting	  to	  draw	  final	  conclusions	  about	  the	  direction	  and	  possible	  
motivation	  behind	  Russian	  educational	  curricula	  and	  political	  speech,	  this	  paper	  will	  instead	  
examine	  historical	  events	  that	  have	  clear	  parallels	  with	  the	  modern	  events	  in	  Chechnya	  and	  
Georgia.	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  hope	  to	  discern	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  a	  strategy	  by	  the	  Russian	  
government	  is	  possible,	  and	  if	  so,	  which	  events	  and	  themes	  lend	  themselves	  well	  to	  the	  
narrative	  that	  the	  government	  might	  present.	  Some	  of	  the	  more	  recent	  events	  might	  have	  
direct	  bearing	  on	  policy	  decisions	  in	  Chechnya	  and	  Georgia	  since	  1991,	  but	  most	  are	  distant	  
enough	  to	  necessitate	  conscious	  invoking	  by	  the	  current	  government	  or	  other	  groups	  to	  
influence	  modern	  public	  opinion.	  
	  
2.	   The	  imposed	  insecurity	  theory	  also	  incorporates	  historical	  regularities	  in	  Russian	  
practices.	  Specifically,	  it	  closely	  concerns	  those	  nations	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  Russia.	  The	  theory	  
holds	  that	  Russian	  security	  depends	  directly	  on	  the	  insecurity	  of	  its	  neighbors	  (Asmus	  2010:9).	  
Though	  “imposed	  insecurity”	  is	  not	  a	  fully	  developed	  theory	  in	  itself,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  term	  to	  
describe	  this	  amalgam	  of	  various	  theories	  based	  on	  Russian	  security	  and	  sphere	  of	  influence	  
tactics.	  By	  keeping	  neighboring	  nations	  in	  a	  near-­‐constant	  state	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  dependence,	  
Russia	  theoretically	  manages	  to	  prevent	  any	  major	  dissent	  or	  defection	  to	  the	  West.	  From	  
imperial	  times,	  weak	  states	  (relative	  to	  Russia)	  on	  the	  border	  have	  posed	  both	  a	  threat	  and	  an	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opportunity.	  The	  threat	  stems	  from	  the	  possibility	  of	  either	  internal	  discord	  spreading	  into	  
Russia	  itself	  or	  takeover	  by	  a	  stronger	  power	  that	  would	  pose	  a	  greater	  threat	  to	  Russia.	  The	  
opportunity	  consists	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  maintaining	  buffer	  states	  or	  participating	  in	  various	  
methods	  of	  interference	  in	  the	  internal	  workings	  of	  the	  neighboring	  governments	  (Hosking	  
2001:190).	  
This	  interference	  often	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  threats,	  either	  outright	  or	  implied,	  against	  the	  
territorial	  sovereignty	  of	  countries	  in	  the	  region.	  Specifically,	  the	  Russian	  government	  takes	  
special	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  a	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  In	  contemporary	  times,	  this	  implies	  
maintaining	  extraordinary	  influence	  over	  the	  fifteen	  newly	  independent	  nations	  that	  formed	  
after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (Filippov	  2009:1825).	  Threats,	  perceived	  or	  actual,	  against	  
the	  borders	  and	  boundaries	  of	  other	  nations	  are	  particularly	  apt	  to	  introduce	  insecurity,	  
because	  the	  “defence	  (sic)	  of	  sovereignty	  over	  one’s	  territory	  is	  the	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  state	  
security	  by	  virtually	  all	  standards	  of	  international	  relations.”	  (Welt	  2010:68).	  If	  this	  theory	  holds	  
true,	  Russia	  continues	  to	  seek	  power	  in	  the	  areas	  where	  it	  has	  historically	  held	  sway,	  and	  also	  in	  
areas	  where	  it	  shares	  ethnic,	  religious,	  or	  other	  cultural	  similarities	  that	  span	  generations.	  
If	  this	  theory	  is	  accurate	  in	  predicting	  the	  behavior	  of	  Russian	  governmental	  actors,	  we	  
would	  see	  attempts	  to	  maintain	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  instability	  in	  bordering	  countries.	  The	  level	  of	  
uncertainty	  will	  ideally	  keep	  that	  nation	  dependent	  on	  Russia	  for	  economic	  or	  social	  stability,	  
without	  escalating	  into	  violent	  uprisings	  or	  massive	  political	  upheaval.	  Such	  extreme	  events	  
would	  likely	  be	  detrimental	  to	  Russian	  interests	  in	  the	  region	  in	  most	  cases.	  The	  instability	  
would	  be	  produced	  by	  a	  constant	  worry	  or	  fear	  of	  Russian	  intervention,	  whether	  political,	  
military,	  or	  economic,	  should	  that	  border	  country	  attempt	  to	  ally	  itself	  with	  an	  outside	  power	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(generally	  a	  Western	  one).	  In	  the	  contemporary	  context,	  interaction	  with	  Western	  countries	  on	  
certain	  levels	  might	  be	  tolerated,	  but	  excessive	  influence	  from	  Western	  powers	  on	  Russia’s	  
border	  nations	  is	  not	  tolerated	  by	  the	  Russian	  government.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  Russia	  does	  not	  
attempt	  to	  use	  too	  severe	  of	  threats	  against	  the	  territorial	  sovereignty	  of	  a	  border	  state,	  as	  a	  
state	  that	  is	  too	  weakened	  would	  become	  easy	  prey	  for	  a	  strong	  outside	  force.	  	  	  	  
An	  expected	  consequence	  of	  this	  strategy	  is	  to	  bring	  the	  Russian	  government’s	  
contemporary	  goals	  in	  opposition	  to	  those	  of	  other	  countries	  beyond	  its	  immediate	  neighbors,	  
with	  predictable	  tension	  as	  a	  result	  (Filippov	  2009:1826).	  At	  times,	  Russia	  appears	  to	  employ	  
this	  strategy	  in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  where	  threats	  to	  sovereignty	  and	  security	  run	  counter	  to	  the	  
1990	  Treaty	  of	  Paris.	  The	  Treaty	  specifically	  rejects	  the	  maintenance	  of	  spheres	  of	  influence	  and	  
emphatically	  states	  that	  the	  borders	  in	  Europe	  are	  not	  to	  be	  changed	  by	  military	  force	  (Asmus	  
2010:225).	  Today,	  perceived	  violations	  of	  this	  treaty	  set	  Russia	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  EU,	  NATO,	  and	  
other	  powers	  in	  the	  region.	  Lending	  credence	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  strategy,	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  
goals	  involving	  satellite	  nations	  appear	  to	  have	  raised	  similar	  tensions	  with	  major	  European	  
powers	  throughout	  much	  of	  its	  history.	  	  
	  
3.	   A	  third	  theory	  of	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  concerns	  current	  events.	  The	  diversionary	  
tension	  theory	  sees	  close	  ties	  between	  more	  assertive	  foreign	  policy	  and	  the	  systematic	  
crackdown	  on	  democracy	  in	  Russia	  during	  the	  Putin	  presidency,	  extending	  into	  the	  Medvedev	  
years	  (Filippov	  2009:1826).	  Certain	  freedoms,	  prominently	  freedom	  of	  speech	  and	  of	  the	  press,	  
are	  sometimes	  curtailed	  in	  Russia	  for	  purposes	  of	  controlling	  dissent.	  Certain	  Western	  
governments,	  and	  the	  Western	  media	  in	  particular,	  harshly	  criticize	  these	  crackdowns.	  As	  a	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result,	  such	  freedoms	  are	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  West	  among	  many	  Russians	  (Pilkington	  et	  
al.	  2002:91-­‐2).	  Various	  segments	  of	  the	  Russian	  populace	  also	  react	  to	  these	  heavy-­‐handed	  
methods	  with	  vociferous	  dissent.	  The	  government	  has	  specific	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policy	  
goals,	  and	  it	  requires	  a	  certain	  democratic	  structure	  within	  the	  Russian	  state	  to	  successfully	  
implement	  those	  goals.	  A	  change	  in	  that	  structure,	  even	  if	  only	  on	  the	  level	  of	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  
relative	  power	  of	  parties,	  could	  fundamentally	  change	  the	  foreign	  policy	  realities	  of	  the	  
government.	  Russia	  wants	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  representing	  its	  peoples’	  interests,	  and	  this	  requires	  a	  
certain	  level	  of	  openness	  in	  democratic	  society	  and	  responsiveness	  to	  public	  opinion.	  This	  
reliance	  on	  public	  support	  can	  be	  dangerous,	  as	  swings	  in	  support	  from	  the	  ruling	  party	  to	  
opposition	  parties	  could	  presage	  a	  loss	  of	  power.	  Should	  the	  ruling	  party	  single	  out	  groups	  
within	  Russia	  for	  attack,	  the	  public	  would	  likely	  see	  through	  such	  a	  ploy.	  The	  state	  realizes	  this,	  
and	  encourages	  “diversionary	  tension”	  with	  foreign	  powers	  to	  rally	  public	  opinion	  behind	  the	  
current	  government,	  and	  against	  the	  “corrosive”	  influence	  of	  the	  West	  (Filippov	  2009:1826).	  If	  
public	  opinion	  can	  be	  turned	  against	  the	  West	  in	  general,	  democratic	  shortcomings	  may	  be	  able	  
to	  be	  swept	  under	  the	  rug	  of	  national	  solidarity	  in	  times	  of	  crisis.	  In	  the	  modern	  sense,	  
diversionary	  tension	  occurs	  when	  an	  incumbent	  government	  engages	  in	  purposeful,	  
premeditated	  international	  conflict	  to	  distract	  its	  constituents	  from	  pressing	  domestic	  issues.	  
	   If	  this	  theory	  of	  policy	  holds	  true,	  Russia	  would	  maintain	  a	  certain	  manageable	  level	  of	  
tension	  with	  historic	  regional	  rivals	  as	  preparation	  against	  future	  domestic	  unrest	  or	  dissent.	  
When	  a	  crackdown	  on	  internal	  dissent	  or	  a	  refocusing	  of	  internal	  narratives	  is	  necessary,	  Russia	  
would	  ignite	  a	  foreign	  conflict	  that	  could	  unify	  public	  opinion	  against	  an	  external	  threat	  
(generally	  the	  West),	  as	  well	  as	  justify	  stricter	  controls	  on	  various	  domestic	  liberties	  and	  actions	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to	  facilitate	  domestic	  control.	  The	  conflict	  would	  not	  involve	  the	  external	  threat	  directly,	  but	  
Russia	  would	  equate	  the	  historic	  rival’s	  actions	  with	  a	  broader	  attempt	  by	  that	  larger,	  external	  
threat	  to	  weaken	  the	  Russian	  nation	  in	  some	  way.	  
For	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  definition	  and	  breakdown	  of	  diversionary	  tension	  advanced	  
by	  Mikhail	  Filippov,	  who	  synthesizes	  the	  various	  theoretical	  aspects	  quite	  well.	  Certain	  
conditions	  must	  exist	  in	  order	  for	  diversionary	  tension	  to	  be	  an	  attractive	  option	  for	  
policymakers,	  and	  for	  such	  an	  attempt	  to	  be	  successful.	  First,	  leaders	  must	  be	  sensitive	  to	  
changes	  in	  public	  opinion.	  Second,	  the	  greater	  transparency	  often	  found	  in	  established	  
democracies	  can	  make	  such	  diversionary	  conflict	  unwise,	  even	  if	  it	  might	  be	  desired,	  as	  there	  is	  
a	  greater	  risk	  of	  the	  public	  seeing	  through	  the	  ruse.	  Thus	  there	  must	  be	  the	  right	  balance	  
between	  sensitivity	  to	  public	  opinion	  and	  transparency.	  Third,	  national	  incumbents	  fearing	  
forcible	  removal	  from	  power	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  effectively	  employ	  this	  tactic.	  Fourth,	  the	  
domestic	  audience	  must	  have	  a	  fairly	  high	  level	  of	  cohesion,	  or	  the	  diversionary	  tactics	  may	  well	  
split	  the	  populace	  over	  an	  issue	  rather	  than	  unite	  them	  behind	  the	  leadership.	  Finally,	  suitable	  
targets	  for	  diversionary	  war	  must	  pose	  a	  low	  military	  risk	  and	  small	  chance	  of	  failure.	  Targets	  of	  
such	  tactics	  have	  every	  incentive	  to	  avoid	  the	  provocations	  for	  war,	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  the	  
easiest	  targets	  are	  countries	  or	  populations	  with	  which	  the	  national	  government	  has	  a	  long-­‐
standing	  rivalry	  (Ibid.:1827-­‐8).	  
	  
4.	   Finally,	  a	  fourth	  theory	  of	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  is	  the	  economic	  enabling	  theory.	  Like	  
imposed	  insecurity,	  this	  is	  a	  term	  I	  will	  use	  to	  describe	  a	  mix	  of	  various	  theories.	  This	  model	  also	  
involves	  national	  stability	  and	  strength,	  particularly	  in	  an	  economic	  sense.	  Following	  the	  falloff	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in	  prestige	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Russia	  seems	  eager	  to	  prove	  to	  the	  word	  that	  it	  
remains	  a	  potent	  force	  in	  international	  relations	  –	  that	  it	  still	  matters	  (Mankoff	  2009:6).	  Being	  
proactive	  and	  taking	  potentially	  divisive	  action	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  can	  require	  a	  position	  of	  
strength	  from	  which	  to	  act.	  This	  strength	  is	  subjective,	  meaning	  that	  it	  is	  Russia’s	  own	  view	  of	  
its	  own	  strength	  that	  matters	  more	  than	  universal	  political	  realities.	  Growing	  economic	  stability	  
(whether	  perceived	  or	  actual)	  both	  facilitates	  and	  may	  be	  essential	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  active,	  
confident	  global	  goal	  seeking	  that	  Russia	  may	  want	  to	  engage	  in	  within	  its	  sphere	  of	  influence	  
(Ibid.:5).	  
	   Under	  this	  theory,	  the	  main	  goal	  of	  Russian	  policy	  is	  to	  be	  a	  major,	  relevant	  player	  on	  
the	  world	  stage.	  Realizing	  that	  such	  a	  position	  will	  require	  economic	  strength,	  Russian	  foreign	  
policy	  will	  be	  applied	  in	  ways	  conducive	  to	  strengthening	  its	  economy.	  Economic	  strength	  can	  
serve	  as	  both	  a	  goal	  and	  an	  enabler	  of	  Russian	  foreign	  policy.	  Certain	  actions	  and	  conflicts	  will	  
be	  undertaken	  to	  achieve	  or	  maintain	  economic	  prosperity,	  and	  once	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  stability	  
is	  assured,	  economic	  mechanisms	  will	  be	  used	  to	  achieve	  foreign	  policy	  goals.	  This	  theory	  does	  
not	  rule	  out	  the	  pursuit	  of	  economic	  strength	  for	  other	  goals,	  such	  as	  growth	  and	  stability	  for	  its	  
own	  sake,	  but	  it	  assumes	  that	  Russian	  primacy	  is	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  economic	  efforts.	  
Reliance	  on	  economic	  stability	  is	  a	  precarious	  basis	  for	  foreign	  policy.	  Even	  before	  the	  
Russian	  economic	  crash	  of	  the	  late	  1990s,	  theorists	  warned	  of	  the	  danger	  of	  Russia’s	  reliance	  
on	  the	  export	  of	  raw	  materials	  (Lieven	  1998:	  173).	  Such	  a	  one-­‐dimensional	  economy	  made	  
Russia	  very	  wealthy	  in	  the	  Putin	  era,	  but	  the	  global	  recession	  that	  began	  in	  earnest	  in	  2008	  has	  
cast	  doubt	  on	  Russia’s	  ability	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  global	  market.	  It	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  track	  Russian	  
action	  in	  Georgia	  and	  Chechnya	  according	  to	  relative	  economic	  stability	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	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action.	  More	  than	  current	  economic	  success	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  however,	  as	  the	  first	  
war	  in	  Chechnya	  was	  waged	  at	  a	  time	  of	  near-­‐poverty	  for	  the	  nascent	  Russian	  Federation.	  The	  
advocates	  of	  economic	  enabling	  theory	  consider	  that	  conflicts	  can	  be	  instigated	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  
future	  economic	  prosperity	  or	  stability,	  as	  long	  as	  either	  the	  current	  level	  of	  economic	  strength	  
allows	  the	  successful	  prosecution	  of	  the	  conflict	  or	  some	  economic	  factor	  makes	  avoiding	  the	  
conflict	  seemingly	  unwise.	  	  
Historical	  Continuity	  Theory	  
The	  story	  of	  Russian	  history	  traditionally	  began	  with	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  Slavs	  in	  
historical	  records	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  6th	  century,	  C.E.	  Occupying	  the	  vast	  Eurasian	  plain,	  political	  
entities	  from	  early	  Kievan	  Rus	  all	  the	  way	  to	  the	  present	  day	  Russian	  Federation	  (all	  such	  
entities	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  “Russian	  states”	  in	  this	  work	  for	  simplicity’s	  sake,	  despite	  their	  
various	  political	  configurations	  and	  ethnic	  makeup)	  have	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  “the	  most	  extensive	  
and	  by	  far	  the	  most	  labile	  of	  the	  world’s	  major	  empires”	  (Hosking,	  2001:3).	  The	  danger	  in	  
equating	  these	  widely	  varying	  political	  entities	  lies	  in	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  modern	  Russian	  
Federation	  is	  substantively	  anything	  like	  the	  Kievan	  Rus	  or	  any	  other	  early	  governmental	  forms.	  
If	  historical	  events	  still	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  modern	  policy,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  either	  more	  recent	  
or	  purposefully	  maintained	  historical	  narratives	  in	  pursuit	  of	  specific	  policy	  goals.	  With	  that	  in	  
mind,	  the	  various	  Russian	  states	  lacked	  easily	  defensible	  borders	  and	  had	  their	  territory	  expand	  
and	  contract	  over	  thousands	  of	  miles	  in	  one	  direction	  or	  another.	  Throw	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  
aggressive	  states	  on	  Russia’s	  borders	  for	  much	  if	  not	  all	  of	  its	  history,	  and	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  why	  
Russians	  see	  themselves	  as	  perpetual	  victims	  of	  foreign	  predation	  (Billington,	  2004:3,152).	  This	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view	  was	  strengthened	  in	  the	  Soviet	  era	  as	  Stalin	  backed	  a	  narrative	  depicting	  Russia	  as	  a	  victim	  
not	  only	  of	  constant	  external	  aggression,	  but	  also	  of	  internal	  betrayal	  (Ibid.:31).	  	  
Of	  course,	  Russia	  also	  played	  the	  role	  of	  aggressor	  quite	  often	  herself.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  
examine	  illustrative	  historical	  episodes	  throughout	  Russia’s	  history	  in	  which	  Russia	  intervened	  
or	  interfered	  in	  the	  foreign	  affairs	  of	  surrounding	  states	  with	  the	  stated	  goal	  of	  either	  
enhancing	  Russian	  stability	  or	  coming	  to	  the	  aid	  of	  a	  certain	  group	  within	  the	  targeted	  region.	  
The	  first	  rationale,	  that	  of	  enhancing	  Russian	  stability	  and	  maintaining	  territorial	  integrity,	  
would	  appear	  similar	  to	  some	  of	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  the	  Chechen	  conflict.	  As	  the	  Caucasus	  
region	  historically	  has	  been	  a	  hotbed	  of	  revolutionary	  sentiment	  and	  secessionist	  movements,	  
the	  historical	  examples	  that	  parallel	  current	  Chechen	  realities	  will	  primarily	  be	  drawn	  from	  that	  
very	  same	  region	  of	  modern-­‐day	  Russia.	  The	  second	  rationale,	  concerning	  incursions	  done	  with	  
a	  stated	  purpose	  of	  aiding	  a	  group	  within	  a	  foreign	  polity	  or	  other	  interference	  in	  foreign	  
governmental	  affairs,	  draws	  clear	  parallels	  with	  Russia’s	  methods	  and	  stated	  motives	  in	  the	  
Georgian	  war	  of	  2008.	  Since	  Russian	  interference	  in	  foreign	  nations	  is	  hardly	  limited	  to	  the	  
South	  Caucasus,	  historical	  examples	  of	  this	  type	  will	  come	  from	  various	  nations	  with	  which	  
Russia	  has	  engaged	  in	  such	  tactics	  throughout	  its	  history.	  	  
As	  a	  few	  of	  the	  most	  salient	  events	  are	  identified,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  determine	  whether	  
or	  not	  Russia	  could	  use	  such	  events	  to	  create	  a	  historical	  narrative	  of	  both	  victimization	  at	  the	  
hands	  of	  foreign	  aggressors	  and	  morally	  justified	  crusades	  on	  behalf	  of	  oppressed	  “brothers”	  
within	  neighboring	  states.	  A	  full	  content	  analysis	  would	  take	  not	  only	  these	  factors	  into	  
account,	  but	  would	  also	  look	  for	  overarching	  themes	  in	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  to	  ascertain	  
whether	  or	  not	  Russia	  strives	  to	  cultivate	  a	  certain	  image	  in	  foreign	  relations	  that	  might	  be	  an	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enabling	  factor	  in	  current	  aggressive	  policy	  actions.	  If	  Russia	  could	  successfully	  cultivate	  a	  
culture	  of	  international	  victimization	  coupled	  with	  righteous	  adventurism,	  the	  Russian	  
population	  might	  be	  much	  more	  tolerant	  of	  aggressive	  policy.	  
There	  are	  far	  too	  many	  historical	  events	  that	  could	  be	  tied	  into	  the	  mindset	  or	  historical	  
narratives	  that	  enabled	  current	  action	  in	  Chechnya	  and	  Georgia	  to	  examine	  in	  any	  depth	  in	  this	  
setting.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  highlight	  a	  few	  telling	  events	  in	  Russian	  
history	  that	  I	  believe	  exhibit	  prevailing	  trends	  that	  may	  bear	  on	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  modern	  
Russian	  Federation.	  The	  events	  I	  examine	  below	  are	  not	  necessarily	  a	  driving	  force	  in	  modern	  
Russian	  politics.	  However,	  should	  historical	  inertia	  play	  a	  role	  in	  current	  policy,	  these	  events	  
show	  continuity	  with	  current	  policy.	  Going	  further,	  should	  Russian	  leadership	  attempt	  to	  
present	  a	  narrative	  that	  portrays	  certain	  types	  of	  action	  as	  the	  only	  viable	  options	  in	  particular	  
conflicts,	  these	  events	  and	  the	  themes	  they	  present	  could	  also	  be	  used	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  
historical	  framework	  for	  Russian	  action.	  
Parallels	  with	  Modern	  Events	  in	  Chechnya	  
Russian	  attempts	  to	  gain	  a	  foothold	  on	  the	  western	  shores	  of	  the	  Caspian	  Sea	  in	  the	  18th	  
century	  brought	  the	  empire	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  various	  tribes	  of	  the	  Caucasus	  region.	  Russian	  
encroachment	  into	  their	  traditional	  ways	  of	  life	  may	  have	  actually	  accelerated	  the	  spread	  of	  
Islam,	  as	  that	  religion	  supported	  an	  ideology	  of	  resistance	  (Hosking	  2001:238).	  In	  1785,	  Sheikh	  
Mansur	  called	  for	  discontinuation	  of	  intertribal	  warfare	  in	  order	  to	  unite	  and	  drive	  out	  the	  
Russian	  invaders.	  Though	  his	  assault	  was	  unsuccessful,	  it	  raised	  policy	  questions	  for	  the	  Russian	  
governing	  elite	  that	  are	  still	  not	  fully	  answered	  today.	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Specifically,	  it	  introduced	  the	  1800s’	  policy	  question	  of	  “the	  sword	  or	  the	  samovar,”	  an	  
idea	  that	  basically	  asks	  “Should	  one	  slash	  the	  enemy	  to	  death	  or	  invite	  him	  for	  a	  cup	  of	  tea?”	  
(Parfitt	  2011).	  Though	  both	  approaches	  have	  been	  tried	  at	  various	  times,	  the	  Russian	  strategy	  
has	  generally	  been	  one	  of	  military	  action,	  beginning	  with	  General	  Alexei	  Ermolov’s	  service	  as	  
the	  governor	  of	  the	  Caucasus.	  He	  burned	  forests	  and	  villages	  alike	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  
depriving	  the	  native	  peoples	  of	  their	  livelihood	  would	  drive	  them	  into	  submission.	  Though	  these	  
methods	  had	  worked	  to	  some	  degree	  in	  the	  steppes,	  the	  heavy-­‐handed	  tactics	  and	  mass	  
deportations	  from	  the	  Caucasus	  “left	  an	  enduring	  legacy	  of	  hatred	  and	  a	  desire	  for	  vengeance	  
which	  has	  made	  the	  Caucasus	  a	  permanent	  festering	  sore	  in	  the	  Russian	  body	  politic”	  (Hosking	  
2001:239-­‐40).	  Though	  outright	  conflict	  has	  waxed	  and	  waned	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  
Chechens,	  feelings	  of	  hatred	  and	  vengeance	  have	  remained	  fairly	  constant.	  At	  various	  points	  in	  
Russian	  history,	  the	  states	  threatening	  Russian	  stability	  and	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  were	  
the	  Mongol	  and	  Ottoman	  Empires.	  By	  this	  point,	  however,	  governmental	  narratives	  attempted	  
to	  make	  Islam	  itself	  the	  enemy	  against	  which	  Russia	  needed	  to	  aggressively	  defend	  itself.	  
Though	  the	  anti-­‐Islamic	  narrative	  did	  not	  remain	  nearly	  as	  prevalent	  as	  Russo-­‐Chechen	  
animosity,	  it	  too	  never	  completely	  left	  the	  national	  consciousness.	  This	  anti-­‐Islamic	  sentiment	  
generalized	  the	  conflict	  beyond	  particular	  ethnicities	  to	  something	  more	  akin	  to	  a	  clash	  of	  
civilizations.	  
There	  are	  several	  parallels	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  between	  the	  early	  conflicts	  with	  the	  
Chechens	  and	  other	  local	  tribes	  and	  the	  two	  Chechen	  wars	  of	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  era.	  As	  they	  did	  
under	  Sheikh	  Mansur,	  various	  tribes	  and	  factions	  united	  against	  the	  Russian	  invaders	  in	  the	  First	  
Chechen	  War	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Due	  in	  part	  to	  Chechnya’s	  small	  size,	  most	  of	  the	  regions	  in	  the	  area	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felt	  threatened	  by	  Russia’s	  incursion	  and	  sent	  volunteers	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  conflict.	  The	  
overwhelming	  forces	  brought	  to	  bear	  against	  a	  much	  smaller,	  religiously	  distinct	  political	  entity	  
aroused	  fears	  of	  an	  eventual	  assault	  on	  all	  Muslim	  enclaves	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  (Lieven	  1998:34).	  
Another	  parallel	  is	  the	  vacillation	  between	  alliances	  with	  local	  leaders	  and	  scorched-­‐
earth	  tactics	  in	  Chechnya.	  Following	  the	  embarrassing	  defeat	  suffered	  by	  Russian	  armed	  forces	  
in	  the	  first	  conflict,	  the	  peace	  treaty	  with	  Chechnya	  called	  for	  a	  political	  solution	  to	  end	  armed	  
conflict	  and	  increase	  economic	  reconstruction	  in	  Chechnya	  (Jack	  2004:	  95).	  Barely	  three	  years	  
later,	  however,	  the	  second	  war	  featured	  a	  return	  to	  the	  scorched	  earth	  tactics	  of	  General	  
Ermolov.	  The	  massive	  devastation	  from	  air	  raids,	  focused	  application	  of	  infantry	  and	  armor,	  and	  
both	  targeted	  and	  indiscriminate	  artillery	  strikes	  may	  have	  reduced	  the	  level	  of	  violent	  attacks	  
from	  Chechen	  insurgents	  (Lyall	  2009:357),	  but	  the	  reduction	  in	  violence	  may	  well	  be	  due	  to	  the	  
lack	  of	  surviving	  militants	  than	  any	  long-­‐lasting	  influence	  on	  the	  motivations	  of	  the	  population	  
of	  Chechnya.	  Much	  as	  they	  did	  in	  the	  1800s,	  scorched-­‐earth	  tactics	  may	  reduce	  immediate	  
levels	  of	  resistance	  and	  insurgent	  violence	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  region,	  but	  provoke	  a	  long-­‐term	  
increase	  in	  resentment	  and	  anger	  in	  not	  only	  Chechnya,	  but	  Russia’s	  other	  restless	  provinces	  in	  
the	  region.	  
Mass	  deportation	  has	  also	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  current	  conflict,	  as	  the	  WWII	  exile	  of	  the	  
entire	  Chechen	  nation	  still	  holds	  a	  powerful	  place	  in	  the	  national	  consciousness	  of	  the	  Chechen	  
people.	  During	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  Stalin’s	  government	  accused	  the	  Chechen-­‐Ingush	  
republic	  of	  conspiring	  with	  the	  Nazis.	  With	  little	  evidence	  against	  them,	  the	  entire	  population	  
was	  forced	  to	  abandon	  their	  republic	  and	  settle	  in	  Kazakhstan.	  Over	  one	  third	  of	  the	  population	  
died	  en	  route,	  and	  their	  return	  was	  only	  made	  possible	  in	  1957	  when	  Khrushchev	  denounced	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many	  of	  Stalin’s	  policies	  (Lapidus	  1998:9).	  This	  episode	  is	  likely	  to	  hold	  a	  much	  more	  salient	  
place	  in	  the	  collective	  memory	  of	  the	  Chechen	  people	  than	  tribal	  warfare	  against	  the	  Russian	  
Empire	  of	  the	  18th	  and	  19th	  centuries,	  but	  that	  does	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  influence	  of	  those	  earlier	  
conflicts.	  The	  invocation	  of	  those	  earlier	  abuses	  would	  need	  to	  be	  more	  consciously	  adopted,	  as	  
unlike	  the	  deportations,	  there	  are	  no	  living	  victims	  of	  the	  early	  wars	  to	  remind	  the	  Chechens	  of	  
Russian	  abuses.	  
The	  divisive	  effects	  of	  this	  violent	  history	  between	  Russia	  and	  Chechnya	  are	  exacerbated	  
by	  a	  lack	  of	  shared	  ethnicity	  and	  religion.	  The	  ancestors	  of	  modern	  Chechens	  have	  lived	  on	  their	  
current	  territory	  for	  at	  least	  6000	  years,	  and	  the	  area	  is	  still	  predominantly	  inhabited	  by	  those	  
of	  Chechen	  descent	  (Nichols,	  1995).	  97%	  of	  modern	  Chechens	  claim	  Chechen	  as	  their	  primary	  
language,	  though	  fluency	  in	  Russian	  is	  common.	  Unlike	  the	  Eastern	  Orthodox	  majority	  in	  Russia	  
as	  a	  whole,	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  Chechens	  are	  Sunni	  Muslims	  whose	  social	  traditions	  
include	  strong	  family	  structure	  and	  clan	  identification	  (Ibid.).	  Even	  after	  the	  ethnic	  Russian	  
colonization	  efforts	  during	  the	  Soviet	  era,	  Chechnya	  was	  probably	  the	  least	  “Russian”	  of	  any	  of	  
the	  autonomous	  republics	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  In	  the	  1989	  census	  of	  all	  republics	  within	  
the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  joint	  Chechen-­‐Ingush	  republic	  had	  the	  “second	  highest	  concentrations	  of	  
members	  of	  the	  titular	  nationality	  in	  the	  total	  population…the	  highest	  proportion	  of	  those	  who	  
considered	  the	  language	  of	  their	  titular	  nationality	  their	  ‘native’	  language	  and…the	  highest	  
levels	  of	  religious	  belief	  and	  practice”	  (Lapidus	  1998:10).	  	  
Parallels	  with	  Modern	  Events	  in	  Georgia	  
For	  the	  first	  twenty	  years	  of	  the	  18th	  century,	  the	  emerging	  Russian	  Empire,	  led	  by	  its	  
impulsive	  young	  leader	  Peter	  I,	  fought	  against	  the	  neighboring	  Swedish	  empire.	  Early	  defeats	  at	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the	  hands	  of	  the	  Swedes	  were	  followed	  by	  the	  modernization	  of	  Peter’s	  army	  and	  the	  
construction	  of	  St.	  Petersburg.	  After	  years	  of	  back	  and	  forth	  battles,	  Russia’s	  new	  Baltic	  Fleet	  
defeated	  the	  Swedish	  navy	  and	  Peter	  was	  able	  to	  devise	  a	  peace	  treaty	  on	  his	  own	  terms.	  
Beyond	  giving	  Russia	  control	  over	  a	  wide	  swath	  of	  territory	  in	  present-­‐day	  Estonia	  and	  north	  of	  
Lake	  Ladoga,	  the	  treaty	  also	  allowed	  Russia	  to	  declare	  itself	  the	  “guarantor”	  of	  the	  1720	  
Swedish	  constitution.	  In	  this	  way,	  Russians	  “claimed	  the	  right	  to	  interfere	  in	  Swedish	  internal	  
politics,	  giving	  themselves	  a	  lever	  to	  project	  their	  power	  [to]	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  Baltic,	  should	  
they	  think	  it	  desirable”	  (Hosking	  2001:187).	  European	  nations,	  concerned	  about	  the	  possibility	  
of	  further	  Russian	  influence,	  took	  a	  united	  stand	  against	  such	  Russian	  interference.	  
In	  a	  similar	  manner,	  Russia’s	  interference	  in	  political	  and	  governmental	  affairs	  in	  South	  
Ossetia	  gave	  them	  such	  a	  lever	  to	  project	  their	  power	  in	  Georgia	  should	  the	  need	  arise.	  Beyond	  
vocal	  support	  for	  the	  Ossetians	  cause,	  Russia	  took	  de	  facto	  control	  of	  many	  aspects	  of	  social	  
welfare	  and	  government	  bureaucracy	  in	  South	  Ossetia,	  including	  paying	  pensions	  and	  
government	  salaries	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  security	  documents	  and	  Russian	  passports	  and	  
residency	  documents	  to	  Ossetians	  in	  the	  region	  (Welt	  2010:77).	  Following	  the	  conflict	  in	  2008,	  
European	  powers	  have	  once	  again	  unanimously	  decried	  the	  projection	  of	  Russian	  power	  into	  a	  
foreign	  country.	  While	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  Russian	  leaders	  consciously	  use	  Peter’s	  experiences	  as	  
a	  guide,	  it	  seems	  more	  likely	  that	  they	  are	  just	  displaying	  similar	  behavioral	  traits	  generated	  
from	  enduring	  cultural	  factors.	  
Another	  set	  of	  historical	  episodes	  that	  could	  contribute	  to	  Russian	  narratives	  and	  
reasoning	  in	  Georgia	  are	  the	  Russian	  policies	  adopted	  toward	  the	  Balkan	  nations	  during	  the	  late	  
1700s	  and	  early	  1800s.	  At	  various	  times	  in	  this	  period,	  Russia	  engaged	  in	  various	  enterprises	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“on	  behalf”	  of	  oppressed	  populations	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  While	  the	  Balkans	  region	  was	  still	  under	  
the	  rule	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  in	  the	  1700s,	  Catherine	  the	  Great	  dispatched	  a	  trusted	  
messenger	  to	  Montenegro	  to	  proclaim	  Russia’s	  desire	  for	  “raising	  and	  liberating…the	  whole	  
Greek	  nation”	  (Mazower	  2000:69).	  The	  Greek	  nation	  referred	  to	  is	  that	  of	  the	  Orthodox	  faith,	  
with	  which	  the	  Russian	  people	  still	  felt	  solidarity,	  despite	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  Greek	  
and	  Russian	  branches	  of	  Orthodoxy.	  The	  revolution,	  devoid	  of	  any	  meaningful	  Russian	  military	  
support,	  was	  a	  failure.	  However,	  it	  did	  raise	  the	  hopes	  of	  many	  Slavs	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  who	  
thought	  that	  the	  day	  of	  their	  liberation	  was	  near.	  The	  Russo-­‐Turkish	  War	  of	  1806-­‐1812	  saw	  
Russian	  troops	  make	  substantial	  advances	  into	  the	  Balkans,	  but	  once	  again	  the	  conflict	  did	  
more	  to	  raise	  Russia’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  potential	  savior	  than	  it	  did	  to	  actually	  bring	  meaningful	  
government	  change	  (Ibid.:72).	  In	  the	  1820s,	  Russia	  took	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  local	  Balkan	  
politics	  as	  military	  rule	  was	  imposed	  over	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Danubian”	  provinces,	  which	  included	  
Serbia.	  Russia’s	  invasion	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  in	  the	  1870s	  led	  to	  declarations	  of	  
independence	  for	  Serbia,	  Montenegro,	  and	  Romania.	  The	  same	  conflict	  begat	  a	  new	  Bulgarian	  
state,	  which	  was	  quickly	  dismantled	  by	  the	  other	  powers	  in	  Europe	  for	  fear	  of	  Russian	  influence	  
in	  Europe.	  Russia	  remained	  a	  “protector”	  of	  Bulgaria	  throughout	  the	  next	  decade,	  as	  it	  took	  
over	  control	  of	  the	  army	  and	  the	  entire	  Ministry	  of	  War	  (Ibid.:90-­‐95).	  	  
Three	  parallels	  with	  current	  events	  are	  shown	  by	  Russian	  intervention	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  
First,	  Russia	  acted	  on	  behalf	  of	  an	  oppressed	  people	  who	  had	  ties	  to	  either	  ethnic	  or	  religious	  
identity	  within	  Russia.	  In	  South	  Ossetia,	  Russia	  claimed	  to	  act	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  the	  ethnic	  
Russians	  living	  there	  (Asmus	  2010:41),	  and	  there	  was	  also	  a	  common	  Orthodox	  religious	  tie	  
between	  the	  South	  Ossetians	  and	  their	  northern	  kin	  living	  within	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  (PCGN	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2007).	  Second,	  the	  slow	  infiltration	  into	  politics	  and	  culture	  that	  led	  to	  support	  for	  
independence	  is	  another	  clear	  parallel	  with	  events	  in	  South	  Ossetia,	  as	  was	  noted	  in	  the	  
previous	  section.	  Finally,	  the	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  unified	  European	  opinion	  against	  growing	  Russian	  
power	  in	  Europe	  (through	  Bulgaria)	  is	  also	  similar	  to	  the	  fairly	  general	  outrage	  over	  Russian	  
actions	  in	  Georgia.	  
Following	  the	  Bolshevik	  revolution	  of	  1917,	  the	  territorial	  boundaries	  of	  the	  Russian	  
Empire	  began	  breaking	  down.	  In	  the	  Georgian	  provinces,	  villagers	  across	  the	  region	  began	  
isolated,	  violent	  uprisings	  against	  the	  Menshevik	  Georgian	  government.	  One	  such	  revolt	  
involved	  the	  ethnic	  Ossetians.	  In	  a	  conflict	  that	  would	  later	  lead	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  
autonomous	  South	  Ossetian	  region	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  Ossetian	  peasantry	  agitated	  for	  
land	  redistribution	  from	  the	  landed	  aristocracy.	  What	  began	  as	  a	  social	  movement	  for	  
redistribution	  became	  an	  ethnic	  conflict,	  seeing	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  landowners	  were	  ethnic	  
Georgian	  nobles.	  Fearing	  defeat	  and	  searching	  for	  powerful	  allies,	  the	  Ossetians	  became	  
Bolsheviks	  and	  the	  conflict	  escalated	  into	  the	  political	  realm	  (Saparov	  2009:109).	  The	  turn	  
toward	  the	  Bolsheviks	  reflected	  the	  historical	  Ossetian	  desire	  to	  leave	  Georgia	  and	  join	  Russia	  
(Ibid.:	  105).	  The	  Ossetians	  wanted	  complete	  separation	  from	  Georgia,	  while	  the	  Georgian	  
government	  wanted	  to	  refuse	  them	  any	  special	  status	  in	  the	  government.	  As	  the	  Bolsheviks	  
prevailed	  in	  the	  Russian	  civil	  war,	  they	  compromised	  by	  creating	  the	  South	  Ossetian	  
Autonomous	  region	  within	  Georgia,	  satisfying	  neither	  side	  (Ibid.:	  120).	  Both	  the	  intervention	  of	  
the	  Russian	  government	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Ossetians	  and	  the	  continued	  desire	  for	  Ossetian	  
unification	  with	  Russia	  have	  a	  clear	  connection	  with	  the	  modern	  conflict.	  This	  continuity	  may	  be	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one	  of	  attitudes	  persisting	  through	  time.	  This	  preference	  for	  connection	  with	  Russia	  is	  partially	  
a	  product	  of	  both	  ethnicity	  and	  religion.	  
The	  Ossetians	  are	  believed	  to	  be	  descendants	  of	  a	  tribal	  Samaritan	  nation	  called	  the	  
Alans	  who	  moved	  into	  the	  area	  hundreds	  of	  years	  ago,	  and	  they	  speak	  an	  Indo-­‐Iranian	  dialect.	  
75%	  are	  Orthodox	  Christians,	  with	  most	  of	  the	  remaining	  population	  adhering	  to	  the	  Sunni	  
branch	  of	  Islam.	  A	  common	  religion	  has	  helped	  the	  Ossetians	  coexist	  rather	  peacefully	  with	  
their	  Russian	  neighbors	  for	  most	  of	  their	  history.	  Upon	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  
traditional	  Ossetian	  lands	  were	  divided	  between	  North	  Ossetia	  in	  Russia	  and	  South	  Ossetia	  in	  
Georgia.	  The	  shared	  ethnicity	  with	  their	  northern	  neighbors,	  coupled	  with	  a	  common	  religious	  
heritage,	  has	  sustained	  the	  desire	  for	  reunification	  with	  Russia	  throughout	  both	  the	  Soviet	  and	  
Post-­‐Soviet	  periods	  (PCGN,	  2007).	  	  
Conclusions	  
	   The	  intrinsic	  problem	  with	  issues	  of	  historical	  continuity	  is	  that	  of	  proving	  causality.	  
Simply	  finding	  similar	  events	  in	  Russia’s	  past	  in	  no	  way	  proves	  that	  said	  events	  are	  determining	  
or	  even	  affecting	  the	  course	  of	  modern	  Russian	  policy.	  The	  over-­‐generalizability	  of	  the	  historical	  
continuity	  is	  its	  greatest	  weakness,	  as	  it	  does	  not	  set	  out	  a	  rigorous	  system	  of	  conditions	  or	  
features	  that	  can	  be	  examined	  and	  tested	  for	  a	  set	  of	  events.	  Still,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  past	  can	  
affect	  the	  present	  passively,	  as	  either	  policy	  decisions	  or	  political	  and	  governmental	  structures	  
instituted	  at	  some	  point	  in	  history	  can	  constrain	  current	  policy	  choices.	  Past	  events	  can	  also	  be	  
used	  actively	  by	  leaders	  seeking	  to	  advance	  their	  own	  agenda,	  either	  by	  drawing	  lessons	  from	  
such	  events	  or	  using	  them	  to	  imbue	  the	  nation	  with	  emotion.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  it	  may	  be	  
possible	  for	  the	  current	  administration	  in	  Russia	  to	  use	  specific	  events	  or	  more	  general	  themes	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in	  Russian	  history	  to	  strengthen	  a	  particular	  cultural	  understanding	  or	  identity	  that	  is	  more	  
accepting	  of	  aggressive	  action	  in	  conflicts	  like	  the	  ones	  in	  Chechnya	  and	  Georgia.	  As	  for	  
historical	  events	  determining	  current	  policy,	  I	  believe	  that	  there	  are	  too	  many	  examples	  of	  
modern	  policy	  being	  driven	  by	  more	  contemporary	  concerns	  to	  accept	  the	  historical	  continuity	  
theory	  as	  the	  major	  driving	  force	  behind	  Russian	  action.	  	  
Imposed	  Insecurity	  Theory	  
	  Historically,	  pressure	  on	  Russia	  from	  both	  Asia	  to	  the	  east	  and	  Europe	  to	  the	  West	  
created	  a	  desire	  for	  controllable	  buffer	  states	  to	  act	  as	  defense	  (Billington	  2004:72).	  This	  
mindset	  has	  continued	  in	  various	  forms	  to	  the	  present	  day,	  and	  Russian	  history	  is	  rife	  with	  
examples	  of	  seemingly	  contradictory	  military	  action:	  offensive	  action	  against	  neighbors	  to	  allow	  
defensive	  action	  against	  more	  distant	  threats	  (Ermath	  2010:86).	  While	  the	  feeling	  of	  threat	  
from	  outside	  may	  persist,	  today’s	  international	  actors,	  particularly	  NATO	  and	  the	  European	  
Union,	  frown	  on	  the	  antiquated	  notion	  of	  “spheres	  of	  influence.”	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  such	  
spheres	  within	  Europe	  were	  specifically	  outlawed	  under	  the	  1990	  Treaty	  of	  Paris.	  In	  reference	  
to	  Russia,	  the	  modern	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “sphere	  of	  influence”	  mainly	  refers	  back	  to	  Soviet-­‐era	  
tactics	  and	  beliefs.	  Modern	  Russian	  political	  leaders	  certainly	  would	  not	  boast	  of	  maintaining	  
such	  a	  view	  toward	  their	  neighbors,	  but	  there	  is	  ample	  evidence	  that	  the	  former	  Soviet	  states	  
hold	  a	  significant	  place	  in	  Russian	  foreign	  policy.	  As	  this	  is	  a	  paper	  about	  understanding	  Russian	  
foreign	  policy	  from	  a	  Western	  perspective,	  I	  will	  use	  “sphere	  of	  influence”	  in	  regard	  to	  current	  
Russian	  policy	  when	  I	  see	  it	  as	  appropriate,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  Russian	  government	  itself	  would	  
endorse	  the	  term.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  Russia	  is	  not	  unique	  in	  its	  approach	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to	  certain	  areas	  of	  the	  world,	  as	  the	  United	  States,	  China,	  and	  other	  powers	  have	  vested	  and	  
claimed	  interests	  in	  certain	  regions	  as	  well.	  
Russian	  tendency	  to	  see	  certain	  areas	  of	  the	  world	  as	  its	  privileged	  sphere	  has	  deep	  
roots	  in	  history.	  Though	  there	  are	  multiple	  factors	  that	  helped	  create	  this	  phenomenon,	  one	  of	  
the	  earliest	  was	  the	  16th-­‐century	  idea	  that	  Moscow	  (then	  still	  called	  Muscovy,	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  
new	  tsarist	  empire)	  was	  the	  “Third	  Rome.”	  The	  Russian	  Orthodox	  church	  of	  the	  time	  advanced	  
the	  idea	  that	  the	  original	  Christian	  faith,	  centered	  in	  Rome,	  had	  become	  corrupted.	  The	  
“Second	  Rome,”	  Constantinople,	  had	  also	  spurned	  the	  true	  faith.	  It	  was	  left	  up	  to	  the	  true	  
Orthodox	  believers	  of	  Russia	  to	  carry	  the	  torch	  of	  Christianity	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  (Hosking	  
2001:103).	  Ironically,	  the	  Third	  Rome	  concept	  carried	  little	  traction	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  first	  
mention,	  and	  was	  actually	  ignored	  by	  state	  authorities	  and	  banned	  by	  church	  officials	  as	  
heretical	  (Poe	  2001:2).	  The	  idea	  only	  gained	  widespread	  popularity	  when	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  
original	  author	  were	  published	  in	  the	  1860s,	  and	  Russian	  historians	  since	  that	  time	  have	  
ascribed	  everything	  from	  “the	  ‘expansionist’	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  Imperial	  era,	  the	  ‘messianic’	  
thought	  of	  the	  Slavophiles	  and	  Panslavs	  of	  the	  later	  nineteenth	  century,	  and	  the	  Bolshevik	  
‘drive	  for	  world	  domination’”	  to	  that	  idea	  (Ibid.).	  Messianic	  urges	  are	  not	  the	  same	  as	  attempts	  
to	  control	  peripheral	  territory,	  but	  the	  Third	  Rome	  idea	  may	  explain	  some	  of	  Russia’s	  forays	  
into	  particular	  regions	  and	  resulting	  feelings	  of	  attachment,	  responsibility,	  or	  privilege.	  
A	  second	  possible	  source	  of	  sphere	  of	  influence	  thinking	  in	  modern	  Russian	  politics	  
stems	  from	  the	  Slavophile	  and	  Pan-­‐Slavism	  movements	  referenced	  previously.	  The	  effects	  of	  
the	  Pan-­‐Slavic	  movement	  on	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  that	  began	  in	  the	  1800s	  are	  far	  too	  
complex	  for	  this	  paper	  to	  cover,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  at	  least	  one	  Russian	  tsar,	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Alexander	  I,	  showed	  signs	  of	  desiring	  to	  unite	  the	  Slavic	  people	  under	  one	  federative	  
government	  	  of	  Slavic	  nations	  (Guins	  1949:125).	  The	  Slavophile	  movement	  within	  Russia	  did	  not	  
have	  universal	  acceptance,	  but	  its	  call	  to	  unify	  Slavic	  culture,	  marked	  by	  Orthodox	  Christianity	  
and	  a	  spirit	  of	  national	  solidarity,	  led	  many	  Russians	  to	  see	  unique	  ties	  between	  themselves	  and	  
Slavs	  worldwide	  (Ibid.:126).	  These	  ties	  permeate	  many	  political	  relationships	  today	  and	  lead	  to	  
Russian	  interest	  in	  certain	  areas	  of	  Europe	  with	  ethnic	  Slavic	  enclaves.	  
The	  third	  historical	  episode	  that	  flavors	  much	  of	  Russia’s	  current	  sphere	  of	  influence	  
thinking	  was	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Unlike	  Orthodox	  Christianity	  or	  Slavic	  ethnicity,	  
communism	  required	  neither	  common	  religion	  nor	  blood	  to	  engage	  outside	  of	  Russia’s	  borders.	  
Using	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  Marxism,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  attempted	  to	  attract	  adherents	  in	  many	  
regions.	  By	  accepting	  or	  coercing	  any	  and	  all	  nations	  whose	  proletariat	  would	  rise	  up	  and	  join	  
the	  communist	  revolution,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  spread	  into	  areas	  where	  the	  Russian	  Empire	  had	  
never	  been	  able	  to	  hold	  consistent	  power,	  namely	  areas	  of	  Central	  Europe	  and	  Central	  Asia.	  The	  
special	  interest	  that	  Russia	  continues	  to	  take	  in	  the	  former	  Soviet	  states	  has	  already	  been	  
mentioned.	  
The	  ideas	  of	  Third	  Rome,	  Pan-­‐Slavism,	  and	  communist	  solidarity	  all	  played	  a	  part	  in	  the	  
special	  role	  that	  Russia	  sees	  for	  itself	  in	  particular	  areas	  of	  the	  world	  today,	  but	  can	  such	  areas	  
truly	  be	  described	  as	  spheres	  of	  influence?	  If	  so,	  does	  Russian	  historical	  activity	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  
explain	  their	  current	  behavior,	  or	  are	  contemporary	  events	  a	  better	  causal	  mechanism?	  	  
The	  idea	  of	  a	  Russian	  sphere	  of	  influence	  has	  changed	  subtly,	  but	  noticeably,	  in	  recent	  
years.	  In	  2008,	  shortly	  following	  the	  cessation	  of	  hostilities	  in	  Georgia,	  President	  Dmitri	  
Medvedev	  spoke	  of	  Russia’s	  goal	  to	  defend	  Russian	  citizens	  abroad	  and	  maintain	  the	  country’s	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spheres	  of	  “privileged	  interest.”	  Toward	  the	  end	  of	  that	  same	  year,	  Defense	  Minister	  Sergei	  
Lavrov	  added	  that	  Russia	  and	  the	  former	  Soviet	  states	  are	  bound	  by	  “unique	  relations”	  and	  
“civilizational	  unity”	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Russian	  Empire	  	  (Trenin	  2009:3-­‐4).	  This	  
distinction	  between	  spheres	  of	  “influence”	  and	  spheres	  of	  “interest”	  is	  nuanced,	  but	  important.	  
Dmitri	  Trenin	  asserts	  that	  the	  changing	  policy	  positions	  that	  Russia	  takes	  toward	  the	  countries	  
that	  were	  part	  of	  the	  Soviet	  sphere	  of	  influence	  shows	  that	  while	  the	  old	  model	  of	  thinking	  
about	  various	  regions	  still	  influences	  contemporary	  Russian	  policy,	  it	  does	  not	  determine	  that	  
policy.	  Whereas	  spheres	  of	  influence	  are	  all	  inclusive	  areas	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  Russia	  that	  by	  
their	  very	  nature	  exclude	  other	  powers	  from	  sharing	  similar	  roles	  of	  power,	  spheres	  of	  interest	  
are	  in	  many	  ways	  more	  specific	  and	  identifiable.	  The	  interests	  deal	  with	  particular	  aspects	  of	  
policy	  with	  certain	  countries,	  rather	  than	  an	  overarching	  dominance	  of	  all	  policy	  within	  certain	  
regions	  (Ibid.:	  13).	  
Where	  the	  imposed	  insecurity	  theory	  is	  weaker	  in	  explaining	  current	  Russian	  behavior,	  
however,	  is	  specifically	  in	  the	  “insecurity”	  portion	  of	  the	  theory.	  Modern	  Russian	  methods	  of	  
influence	  lean	  more	  toward	  economic	  integration,	  the	  soft	  power	  of	  media	  and	  language,	  and	  
strategic	  positioning	  against	  Islamic	  militants	  or	  other	  threats	  (Ibid.:12-­‐14).	  The	  only	  major	  
example	  of	  imposed	  territorial	  insecurity	  that	  has	  occurred	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  is	  
the	  Georgian	  conflict,	  fought	  in	  large	  measure	  to	  stop	  Georgia	  from	  joining	  NATO	  and	  the	  EU	  at	  
almost	  any	  cost	  (Asmus	  2010:216).	  As	  the	  conflict	  in	  Georgia	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  only	  key	  
departure	  from	  the	  new	  sphere	  of	  interest	  thinking,	  the	  other	  possible	  reasons	  for	  that	  conflict	  
will	  be	  examined	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  invasion	  of	  Georgia	  could	  be	  
the	  start	  of	  a	  new	  trend,	  rather	  than	  an	  anomaly	  in	  an	  otherwise	  more	  peaceful	  era.	  As	  this	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cannot	  be	  assessed	  without	  future	  Russian	  behavior	  taken	  into	  account,	  it	  remains	  only	  a	  
possibility.	  Rather	  than	  threatening	  territorial	  integrity,	  Russia	  has	  in	  recent	  years	  turned	  
toward	  what	  the	  West	  deems	  “energy	  diplomacy”,	  which	  includes	  various	  forms	  of	  threats,	  
slowdowns,	  and	  shutdowns	  of	  the	  supply	  of	  natural	  gas	  and	  oil	  to	  countries	  with	  which	  Russia	  
has	  disagreements	  (Tsygankov	  and	  Tarver-­‐Wahlquist	  2009:309,311).	  	  
	  Despite	  the	  change	  in	  Russian	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  influence	  to	  interest,	  for	  Western	  
nations	  the	  mere	  invocation	  of	  privileged	  interest	  raises	  the	  possibility	  of	  special	  rights	  for	  
Russia	  in	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  space	  that	  other	  countries	  do	  not	  share.	  Beyond	  tension	  with	  Europe	  
under	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Paris,	  this	  approach	  also	  brings	  Russia	  squarely	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  post-­‐
Cold	  War	  goals	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  region.	  Allowing	  Russia	  to	  claim	  privileged	  interests	  
and	  rights	  in	  Europe	  would	  repudiate	  more	  than	  20	  years	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  area	  
(Larrabee	  2010:37).	  This	  illustrates	  one	  of	  the	  basic	  conundrums	  of	  modern	  Russian	  policy:	  
leaders	  seem	  to	  want	  to	  engage	  in	  “Great	  Power”	  politics	  internationally,	  which	  requires	  a	  
certain	  level	  of	  accommodation	  for	  foreign	  opinion,	  but	  they	  also	  want	  the	  latitude	  to	  assert	  
themselves	  in	  the	  former	  Soviet	  states	  (Mankoff	  2009:243).	  Most	  scholars	  see	  this	  aggressive	  
policy	  of	  interference	  as	  restarting	  under	  Putin,	  but	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  the	  drive	  toward	  
Russian	  primacy	  seen	  under	  Putin	  and	  Medvedev	  is	  merely	  the	  culmination	  of	  a	  process	  which	  
began	  under	  Yeltsin	  (Ibid.:3-­‐4).	  The	  new	  Russian	  primacy	  may	  be	  one	  of	  interests	  rather	  than	  
influence,	  but	  that	  doesn’t	  stop	  Western	  political	  leaders	  from	  drawing	  parallels	  to	  Cold	  War	  
tactics.	  From	  Russia’s	  point	  of	  view,	  those	  accusations	  are	  fairly	  hypocritical,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  West	  
that	  seems	  to	  be	  continuing	  to	  expand	  its	  own	  sphere	  of	  influence	  at	  Russia’s	  expense.	  Factors	  
seen	  as	  encroachments	  into	  traditionally	  Russian	  interests	  include	  the	  Western	  support	  for	  the	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various	  “color	  revolutions,”	  NATO	  expansion	  following	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  missile	  defense	  
installations	  in	  Europe,	  anti-­‐Russian	  rhetoric,	  and	  most	  of	  all,	  the	  emergence	  of	  Kosovo	  as	  an	  
independent	  state	  (Tsygankov	  and	  Tarver	  Wahlquist	  2009:309).	  	  
The	  imposed	  insecurity	  theory	  is	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  foreign	  affairs.	  How	  does	  
Chechnya,	  being	  a	  constituent	  part	  of	  the	  Russian	  federation	  rather	  than	  a	  border	  nation,	  fit	  
with	  a	  theory	  of	  spheres	  of	  interest	  or	  influence?	  Of	  note	  here	  are	  the	  parallels	  between	  the	  
original	  reasons	  for	  the	  Russian	  invasions	  of	  Chechnya	  in	  the	  1800s	  contrasted	  with	  the	  goals	  of	  
the	  conflict	  in	  the	  1900s.	  Lieven	  sees	  three	  such	  common	  themes:	  the	  failure	  of	  sphere	  of	  
influence	  tactics,	  the	  tradition	  of	  banditry,	  and	  lines	  of	  communication	  running	  through	  
Chechnya	  (Lieven	  1998:312).	  In	  the	  1800s,	  Russia	  was	  often	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  
At	  first,	  Russia	  attempted	  to	  use	  Chechnya	  as	  a	  buffer	  zone.	  Their	  support	  of	  corrupt,	  secular	  
regimes	  in	  Dagestan	  led	  to	  an	  Islamic	  uprising	  that	  spread	  to	  Chechnya,	  however,	  and	  
threatened	  to	  lead	  to	  support	  and	  possible	  invasion	  from	  the	  Ottomans	  (Hosking	  2001:329).	  
The	  Russian	  government	  used	  this	  danger,	  along	  with	  the	  inability	  of	  Chechen	  leaders	  to	  
restrain	  bandits,	  as	  pretexts	  for	  taking	  control	  of	  Chechnya.	  The	  final	  factor	  was	  the	  vital	  
strategic	  interest	  that	  Russia	  saw	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  “lines	  of	  communication”	  referenced	  by	  
Lieven	  refer	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  communication	  across	  the	  Caucasus	  was	  nearly	  impossible	  for	  
Russia	  without	  holding	  Chechnya.	  Without	  that	  communication,	  the	  prosecution	  of	  a	  conflict	  
with	  the	  Ottomans	  would	  have	  been	  very	  dangerous	  (Lieven	  1998:13-­‐14).	  
Can	  these	  parallels	  truly	  apply	  to	  the	  1990s’	  conflict	  when	  Chechnya	  was	  still	  a	  
constituent	  member	  of	  the	  Russian	  state?	  In	  reality,	  things	  were	  not	  so	  clear.	  Chechnya	  was	  
never	  a	  complacent	  subunit	  of	  the	  Russian	  Empire,	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  or	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  Russian	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Federation.	  On	  September	  6th,	  1991,	  Chechnya	  made	  a	  unilateral	  declaration	  of	  independence	  
from	  the	  new	  Russian	  state.	  Russia,	  preoccupied	  with	  Ukraine,	  the	  Baltics,	  and	  a	  host	  of	  other	  
problems,	  barely	  even	  contested	  the	  move.	  Unlike	  during	  previous	  Chechen	  uprisings	  or	  
independence	  movements,	  the	  Russians	  made	  no	  immediate	  armed	  attempts	  to	  find	  resolution	  
to	  the	  conflict	  other	  than	  moving	  troops	  to	  the	  border,	  occasional	  verbal	  denunciations	  of	  the	  
declaration,	  and	  an	  ineffective	  trade	  blockade	  coupled	  with	  economic	  sanctions	  (Ibid.:	  74).	  In	  an	  
interesting	  episode,	  Russia	  continued	  to	  pump	  their	  oil	  into	  Chechnya	  for	  processing,	  and	  then	  
allowed	  the	  refined	  product	  to	  enter	  Russia	  again,	  despite	  the	  blockade	  and	  “sanctions.”	  	  The	  
Russian	  Prime	  minister	  in	  1992,	  Yegor	  Gaidar,	  gave	  the	  following	  reasoning:	  
“The	  Grozny	  oil	  refinery	  is	  the	  largest	  oil-­‐refining	  enterprise	  in	  Russia	  and	  used	  to	  supply	  a	  
considerable	  part	  of	  the	  North	  Caucasus,	  Stavropol	  Kray,	  Krasnodar	  Kray,	  etc.	  In	  this	  regard,	  
turning	  off	  the	  petroleum	  faucet	  all	  at	  once	  […]	  would	  have	  punished	  not	  only	  Chechnya,	  but	  
also	  Russia”	  (qtd.	  in	  Lieven	  1998:74-­‐75).	  
These	  actions	  are	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  sphere	  of	  influence	  policies	  undertaken	  by	  Russia	  
or	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  at	  various	  points	  in	  history.	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  actions	  are	  more	  similar	  to	  
interactions	  with	  a	  stubborn	  foreign	  nation	  than	  to	  interactions	  with	  a	  rebellious	  subunit	  of	  its	  
own	  state.	  Did	  these	  instances	  show	  that	  Russia	  once	  did	  not	  mind	  the	  idea	  of	  Chechen	  
autonomy,	  or	  that	  they	  simply	  lacked	  the	  ability	  to	  do	  anything	  about	  it	  at	  the	  time?	  Many	  
scholars	  believe	  that	  Chechnya’s	  de	  facto	  independence	  between	  1992	  and	  1994	  was	  clear	  
proof	  of	  Russian	  political	  impotence	  rather	  than	  a	  marked	  change	  in	  Russian	  policy	  (Trenin	  et	  al.	  
2004:	  11).	  Concerned	  more	  with	  survival	  than	  assertive	  foreign	  policy,	  the	  nascent	  Russian	  
Federation	  left	  Chechnya	  to	  its	  own	  devices	  for	  a	  short	  time.	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As	  happened	  in	  the	  1800s,	  however,	  sphere	  of	  influence	  tactics	  were	  not	  enough	  to	  
overcome	  Chechen	  banditry,	  and	  the	  region	  was	  still	  of	  vital	  strategic	  interest.	  The	  banditry	  in	  
modern	  days	  took	  the	  form	  of	  a	  series	  of	  bus	  hijackings	  by	  armed	  criminals,	  one	  of	  several	  
factors	  that	  may	  have	  been	  necessary	  for	  the	  outbreak	  of	  war,	  if	  not	  sufficient	  by	  themselves	  
(Lieven	  1998:314).	  The	  lines	  that	  ran	  through	  Chechnya	  this	  time	  did	  more	  than	  facilitate	  
communication	  -­‐	  they	  pumped	  oil.	  I’ll	  look	  into	  the	  economic	  factors	  behind	  the	  Chechen	  wars	  
in	  more	  detail	  in	  a	  later	  section.	  
Conclusions	  
	   Despite	  Western	  views	  to	  the	  contrary,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  interests	  that	  Russia	  
seeks	  on	  its	  periphery	  are	  neither	  identical	  in	  scope	  nor	  focus	  to	  those	  sought	  throughout	  its	  
history.	  A	  theory	  of	  imposed	  insecurity	  foresees	  an	  aggressive	  Russia	  constantly	  pushing	  and	  
prodding	  at	  the	  borders	  of	  neighboring	  states	  to	  exploit	  their	  weaknesses	  and	  keep	  them	  from	  
fully	  embracing	  the	  West.	  While	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  one	  of	  Russia’s	  major	  goals	  is	  still	  to	  prevent	  
such	  wholesale	  defection,	  it	  is	  also	  clear	  that	  Russia	  lacks	  either	  the	  ability	  or	  the	  will	  to	  go	  to	  
any	  and	  all	  lengths	  to	  influence	  such	  decisions,	  with	  Georgia	  being	  the	  one	  possible	  exception.	  
The	  old	  sphere	  of	  Russian	  influence	  continues	  to	  affect	  Russia’s	  thinking,	  but	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  tell	  
whether	  or	  not	  that	  is	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  shared	  history	  and	  current	  convenience	  for	  Russian	  
policymakers.	  The	  special	  interests	  in	  the	  former	  Soviet	  states	  could	  stem	  more	  from	  shared	  
cultural,	  linguistic,	  and	  regional	  traits	  than	  from	  any	  lasting	  historical	  mission	  (whether	  
messianic,	  ethnic,	  or	  ideological)	  that	  Russia	  may	  possess.	  Again,	  the	  imposed	  insecurity	  theory	  
is	  limited	  in	  its	  descriptive	  or	  predictive	  power	  by	  its	  simplicity.	  Fleshing	  out	  the	  theory	  with	  
more	  exact	  conditions	  and	  testable	  hypotheses	  would	  improve	  its	  utility.	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Diversionary	  Tension	  Theory	  
	   Filippov’s	  argument	  about	  diversionary	  tension	  was	  in	  direct	  response	  to	  the	  Georgia	  
conflict,	  so	  in	  his	  view	  that	  conflict	  meets	  the	  minimum	  criteria	  for	  such	  tactics.	  Even	  still,	  it	  is	  
worthwhile	  to	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  how	  Russia’s	  domestic	  situation	  and	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  fit	  
the	  various	  criteria	  of	  desired	  and	  potentially	  successful	  diversionary	  tension.	  Afterward,	  I’ll	  
take	  a	  look	  at	  how	  well	  those	  criteria	  fit	  the	  situation	  in	  Chechnya,	  and	  whether	  enough	  
parallels	  can	  be	  drawn	  with	  that	  nominally	  domestic	  conflict	  to	  show	  a	  wider	  trend	  in	  Russian	  
policymaking.	  Following	  a	  quick	  review	  of	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  according	  to	  Filippov	  
(2009:1827-­‐8),	  I	  will	  systematically	  study	  each	  conflict’s	  fit	  under	  each	  condition.	  These	  
conditions	  as	  listed	  describe	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  such	  a	  strategy	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  
successful,	  but	  I	  will	  also	  show	  how	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  conditions	  in	  each	  conflict	  made	  the	  
strategy	  desirable	  to	  Russian	  policymakers.	  Even	  if	  such	  a	  strategy	  would	  have	  been	  desirable	  at	  
the	  time,	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  follow	  that	  policymakers	  attempted	  to	  use	  any	  form	  of	  
diversionary	  tension.	  Each	  conflict	  will	  also	  be	  studied	  to	  see	  if	  evidence	  of	  such	  tactics	  exists.	  
Conditions	  
1. Leaders	  must	  be	  sensitive	  to	  changes	  in	  public	  opinion.	  
2. The	  greater	  transparency	  often	  found	  in	  established	  democracies	  can	  make	  such	  
diversionary	  conflict	  unwise,	  even	  if	  it	  might	  be	  desired,	  as	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  risk	  of	  the	  
public	  seeing	  through	  the	  ruse.	  
3. National	  incumbents	  fearing	  forcible	  removal	  from	  power	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  
effectively	  employ	  this	  tactic.	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4. The	  domestic	  audience	  must	  have	  a	  fairly	  high	  level	  of	  cohesion,	  or	  the	  
diversionary	  tactics	  may	  well	  split	  the	  populace	  over	  an	  issue	  rather	  than	  unite	  them	  
behind	  the	  leadership.	  
5. Suitable	  targets	  for	  diversionary	  war	  must	  pose	  a	  low	  military	  risk	  and	  small	  
chance	  of	  failure.	  Targets	  of	  such	  tactics	  have	  every	  incentive	  to	  avoid	  the	  provocations	  
for	  war,	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  the	  easiest	  targets	  are	  countries	  or	  populations	  with	  which	  
the	  national	  government	  has	  a	  long-­‐standing	  rivalry.	  	  
	  
Georgia	  
1. There	  is	  a	  general	  consensus	  by	  outside	  observers	  that	  Russia	  has	  moved	  further	  
and	  further	  toward	  authoritarianism	  under	  Putin	  and	  Medvedev.	  Despite	  the	  increasing	  
control	  and	  centralization	  undertaken	  by	  the	  national	  government,	  there	  are	  still	  signs	  
that	  leaders	  are	  sensitive	  to	  changes	  in	  public	  opinion.	  Party	  strategists	  within	  the	  
Kremlin	  are	  reported	  to	  be	  “assiduous	  students	  of	  public	  opinion”	  (March	  2009:513).	  
The	  popularity	  of	  Putin	  (and	  Medvedev,	  though	  the	  effects	  have	  not	  been	  fully	  studied)	  
is	  partially	  dependent	  on	  fraud,	  voter	  pressure,	  and	  high	  oil	  prices,	  but	  also	  due	  in	  part	  
to	  his	  responsiveness	  to	  voter	  behavior	  and	  opinion.	  He	  garners	  such	  strong	  support	  in	  
Russia	  through	  agreeing	  with	  the	  electorate	  on	  important	  issues,	  showing	  himself	  as	  a	  
competent	  leader,	  and	  connecting	  closely	  with	  important	  demographic	  groups	  within	  
Russia	  (Colton	  and	  Hale	  2009:502).	  Though	  Putin	  and	  Medvedev’s	  popularity	  remained	  
high	  after	  the	  2008	  election,	  increasing	  worry	  about	  popular	  sentiment	  toward	  Western	  
institutions	  and	  countries	  played	  a	  large	  part	  in	  motivating	  Russia	  to	  handle	  the	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Georgian	  conflict	  in	  the	  way	  that	  it	  did,	  according	  to	  Filippov	  (2009:1829).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
Georgia,	  by	  the	  time	  the	  conflict	  began	  in	  earnest	  in	  August,	  Russia	  had	  nearly	  full	  
support	  from	  the	  domestic	  population	  for	  the	  military	  efforts	  in	  South	  Ossetia,	  and	  
maintained	  that	  support	  through	  careful	  control	  of	  the	  narratives	  behind	  the	  conflict	  
(Tsygankov	  and	  Tarver-­‐Wahlquist	  2009:324).	  
2. To	  put	  it	  mildly,	  “greater	  transparency”	  is	  not	  something	  that	  the	  Russian	  
government	  generally	  struggles	  with.	  The	  tumultuous	  years	  of	  the	  1990s	  featured	  a	  
fairly	  free	  media,	  and	  the	  resulting	  reports	  of	  various	  failings	  on	  the	  part	  of	  government	  
officials	  led	  to	  very	  negative	  public	  opinion	  during	  the	  first	  Chechen	  conflict	  and	  through	  
the	  financial	  collapse	  beginning	  in	  1998	  (Jack	  2004:94-­‐5).	  Putin	  realized	  that	  an	  
independent	  media	  can	  be	  anathema	  to	  a	  government	  that	  planned	  to	  accumulate	  
power	  through	  centralization	  of	  key	  institutions	  and	  control	  over	  key	  industries.	  His	  
systematic	  takeover	  and	  silencing	  of	  many	  media	  outlets	  reduced	  governmental	  
transparency	  significantly	  (Larrabee	  2010:35).	  Lack	  of	  transparency	  facilitates	  the	  type	  
of	  authoritarian	  resurgence	  that	  Putin	  seemed	  to	  want,	  but	  it	  also	  is	  one	  of	  the	  qualities	  
most	  criticized	  by	  Western	  media	  and	  policymakers	  alike.	  Application	  of	  diversionary	  
tension	  may	  have	  seemed	  tempting	  because	  it	  could	  simultaneously	  discredit	  those	  
Western	  voices	  while	  keeping	  authoritarian	  changes	  and	  centralization	  in	  place.	  This	  
tension	  allowed	  governmental	  control	  over	  media	  narratives	  throughout	  key	  events	  
leading	  up	  to	  the	  Georgian	  conflict,	  including	  the	  Second	  Chechen	  War	  and	  the	  various	  
flare-­‐ups	  within	  Georgia	  that	  preceded	  the	  2008	  war.	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3. Despite	  Putin	  and	  Medvedev’s	  fairly	  secure	  hold	  on	  power,	  there	  is	  always	  the	  
possibility	  of	  forcible	  removal.	  No	  amount	  of	  voter	  pressure	  or	  manipulation	  of	  party	  
politics	  can	  protect	  an	  incumbent	  from	  a	  total	  popular	  uprising,	  as	  recent	  events	  in	  the	  
Middle	  East	  and	  northern	  Africa	  make	  clear.	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  Russia’s	  swift	  
criticism	  of	  the	  various	  “color	  revolutions”	  in	  2004	  and	  2005	  was	  the	  fear	  that	  such	  
governmental	  changes	  were	  the	  dress	  rehearsals	  for	  a	  Western	  conspiracy	  that	  would	  
lead	  to	  such	  a	  revolution	  within	  Russia	  and	  the	  installation	  of	  a	  leader	  sympathetic	  to	  
Western	  (i.e.	  U.S.)	  interests	  (Trenin	  2009:12).	  
4. National	  cohesion	  is	  fairly	  high	  in	  Russia,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  ideology	  and	  a	  
sense	  of	  national	  unity.	  The	  large	  majority	  of	  Russians	  have	  supported	  Putin	  and	  
Medvedev’s	  party,	  United	  Russia,	  in	  recent	  elections.	  Putin	  won	  71%	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  
2004,	  and	  Medvedev	  won	  with	  70%	  four	  years	  later.	  In	  the	  most	  recent	  Duma	  elections,	  
in	  2007,	  United	  Russia	  carried	  64%	  of	  the	  total	  vote	  (Colton	  and	  Hale	  2009:475).	  Though	  
division	  exists,	  a	  large	  enough	  proportion	  of	  the	  electorate	  is	  sympathetic	  to	  or	  
supportive	  of	  the	  party	  in	  power	  that	  they	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  support	  most	  foreign	  policy	  
positions.	  Cultural	  and	  identity	  factors	  that	  unify	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  population	  
include	  a	  respect	  for	  traditional	  Russian	  culture	  that	  is	  insulated	  from	  harmful	  Western	  
influences	  (Pilkington	  et	  al.	  2002:xvi).	  Other	  factors	  are	  a	  shared	  perception	  of	  Russian	  
honor	  (Tsygankov	  and	  Tarver-­‐Wahlquist	  2009:309)	  and	  a	  sense	  that	  Russia	  should	  
“matter”	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  (Mankoff	  2009:6).	  These	  related	  traits	  allow	  Russian	  
leaders	  to	  unify	  public	  opinion	  behind	  foreign	  policy	  actions	  that	  are	  seen	  to	  counteract	  
threats	  to	  Russian	  primacy	  or	  reputation.	  Diversionary	  tensions	  using	  Georgia	  would	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only	  have	  been	  attempted	  if	  the	  Russian	  leadership	  felt	  that	  a	  focused	  attack	  on	  
Western	  values	  would	  be	  met	  with	  a	  fairly	  uniform	  response	  from	  the	  public	  rather	  than	  
fragmentation	  of	  support.	  
5. As	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  this	  paper,	  the	  rivalry	  between	  Russia	  and	  Georgia	  
concerning	  the	  Ossetian	  region	  dates	  back	  to	  the	  1920s	  and	  beyond.	  The	  Russian	  non-­‐
resolution	  of	  that	  conflict	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  secession	  conflicts	  that	  erupted	  following	  
the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Militarily,	  Georgia	  was	  no	  match	  for	  the	  Russian	  armed	  
forces	  arrayed	  against	  them	  in	  2008.	  The	  rivalry	  with	  Russia	  led	  Georgia	  into	  the	  conflict	  
as	  it	  sought	  to	  distance	  itself	  from	  its	  much	  larger	  and	  more	  powerful	  neighbor	  by	  
attempting	  integration	  with	  the	  West	  (Asmus	  2010:216).	  The	  same	  rivalry	  pushed	  
Georgian	  President	  Mikheil	  Saakashvili	  into	  stronger	  policy	  positions	  than	  were	  probably	  
wise	  considering	  the	  looming	  Russian	  threat.	  The	  historic	  animosity	  between	  the	  two	  
countries	  promised	  a	  domestic	  bump	  in	  public	  opinion	  if	  Saakashvili	  took	  a	  hard	  line	  
against	  the	  Russians,	  and	  war	  was	  the	  result	  (Filippov	  2009:1839).	  The	  tumultuous	  
history	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  and	  the	  long-­‐held	  desire	  of	  South	  Ossetians	  to	  join	  
with	  their	  northern	  kin	  made	  this	  rivalry	  more	  attractive	  to	  the	  Russians	  than	  other	  
potential	  conflicts,	  as	  the	  pretext	  of	  self-­‐determination	  for	  the	  oppressed	  Ossetians	  was,	  
for	  the	  Russians	  at	  least,	  a	  justifiable	  reason	  for	  invasion.	  	  
The	  diversionary	  aspect	  of	  the	  Georgian	  conflict	  was	  the	  attempt	  by	  Russia	  to	  reconcile	  
two	  partially	  contradictory	  ideals:	  openness	  to	  mutual	  economic	  dependence	  on	  the	  West	  and	  
resistance	  of	  Western	  voices	  that	  called	  for	  greater	  transparency	  and	  democratization	  within	  
the	  Russian	  governmental	  system	  (Ibid.:1829).	  Though	  the	  Russian	  populace	  may	  have	  wanted	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greater	  transparency	  and	  democratization	  on	  some	  level,	  the	  Russian	  government	  managed	  to	  
equate	  such	  values	  with	  Western	  interference	  and	  meddling	  in	  Russian	  affairs.	  The	  conflict	  with	  
Georgia,	  though	  based	  on	  legitimate	  concerns	  with	  Georgian	  policy,	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  proxy	  
conflict	  to	  mobilize	  public	  opinion	  against	  the	  West.	  According	  to	  Filippov,	  there	  is	  an	  optimal	  
range	  of	  tension	  with	  the	  West	  that	  Russia	  tries	  to	  maintain,	  realizing	  that	  its	  population	  is	  both	  
motivated	  and	  unified	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  external	  threat.	  Ideally,	  the	  level	  of	  tension	  never	  
rises	  high	  enough	  to	  seriously	  threaten	  economic	  relationships	  and	  agreements,	  but	  is	  always	  
sufficient	  to	  discredit	  Western	  voices	  that	  call	  for	  increased	  transparency,	  democratization,	  and	  
reform	  (Ibid.:1826-­‐30).	  This	  strategy	  was	  not	  fully	  successful,	  as	  foreign	  investors	  began	  pulling	  
out	  of	  the	  Russian	  market	  shortly	  before	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Georgian	  conflict	  due	  to	  the	  
increasing	  political	  and	  economic	  risks	  (Mankoff	  2009).	  Still,	  the	  related	  goals	  of	  preventing	  
Georgian	  integration	  with	  the	  West	  and	  preventing	  active	  agitation	  within	  Russia	  for	  similar	  
integration	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  met,	  at	  least	  for	  now.	  The	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  Russian	  policy	  in	  
Georgia	  remain	  unclear.	  
Chechnya	  
1. Due	  to	  the	  greater	  latitude	  given	  to	  independent	  media	  and	  popular	  opinion	  in	  
the	  years	  following	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Russian	  leaders	  were	  of	  necessity	  
more	  aware	  of	  and	  responsive	  to	  shifts	  in	  public	  opinion.	  Though	  there	  were	  many	  
causes	  of	  the	  Chechen	  conflict	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  a	  not-­‐insignificant	  factor	  was	  the	  
cultural	  phenomenon	  of	  a	  Russian	  national	  identity	  that	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  state	  and	  a	  desire	  
to	  “back	  a	  winner,”	  as	  it	  were	  (Lieven	  1998:169).	  Another	  cultural	  factor	  was	  the	  
people’s	  desire	  for	  a	  strong	  and	  decisive	  leader,	  particularly	  when	  the	  country	  is	  seen	  to	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be	  in	  decline	  (Mishler	  and	  Willerton	  2003:112).Yeltsin’s	  invasion	  of	  Chechnya	  in	  1994	  
was	  motivated	  in	  part	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  appear	  such	  a	  leader,	  despite	  the	  general	  
unwillingness	  of	  the	  Russian	  population	  to	  become	  embroiled	  in	  such	  a	  conflict	  (Lieven	  
1998:84,87).	  By	  responding	  to	  public	  demand	  for	  a	  decisive	  leader	  but	  misreading	  the	  
direction	  that	  the	  public	  wanted	  the	  country	  to	  move,	  Yeltsin	  was	  drawn	  into	  what	  
became	  a	  vastly	  unpopular	  war.	  
2. The	  difference	  in	  governmental	  transparency	  between	  the	  first	  and	  second	  
conflicts	  in	  Chechnya	  is	  striking.	  The	  brutal	  tactics	  employed	  by	  the	  military	  were	  widely	  
criticized	  by	  a	  free	  media	  that	  was	  then	  still	  aggressively	  independent	  (Jack	  2004:95).	  
False	  claims	  of	  success	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  trying	  to	  achieve	  “popular”	  goals	  were	  met	  
with	  fierce	  scorn	  by	  journalists,	  and	  the	  increased	  availability	  of	  combat	  footage	  and	  
information	  soured	  public	  opinion	  quickly	  (Lieven	  1998:111).	  Understanding	  that	  this	  
explosion	  of	  negative	  publicity	  had	  in	  many	  ways	  cost	  Yeltsin	  his	  popular	  support,	  one	  of	  
Putin’s	  major	  moves	  in	  office	  was	  the	  curtailing	  of	  media	  freedom	  and	  nationalization	  of	  
many	  media	  outlets	  (Larrabee	  2010:35).	  This	  increased	  control	  allowed	  the	  second	  
conflict	  to	  be	  prosecuted	  with	  many	  of	  the	  same	  heavy-­‐handed	  military	  practices	  
without	  nearly	  the	  same	  level	  of	  backlash	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Russian	  people.	  As	  in	  the	  
Georgian	  conflict,	  the	  Russian	  people’s	  awareness	  of	  this	  lack	  of	  transparency	  would	  
make	  strategies	  to	  divert	  their	  attention	  attractive	  to	  Russian	  leadership.	  	  
3. Yeltsin	  was	  reelected	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  failing	  war	  against	  Chechnya	  in	  the	  mid-­‐
1990s.	  His	  return	  to	  the	  presidency	  was	  never	  guaranteed,	  but	  in	  one	  interesting	  aspect	  
his	  position	  may	  actually	  have	  been	  more	  secure	  from	  forcible	  popular	  removal.	  Despite	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abysmal	  ratings	  for	  his	  performance	  during	  the	  Chechen	  war,	  Yeltsin	  benefited	  from	  a	  
pervasive	  sense	  of	  political	  apathy	  coupled	  with	  a	  fear	  of	  chaos.	  The	  apathy	  led	  to	  a	  very	  
low	  level	  of	  active	  opposition	  to	  Yeltsin,	  and	  a	  desire	  for	  a	  calm	  transition,	  coupled	  with	  
significant	  support	  from	  Russian	  bankers	  in	  exchange	  for	  resource	  control,	  ensured	  a	  
second	  term	  (Lieven	  1998:14).	  As	  the	  Russian	  political	  situation	  grew	  more	  stable	  under	  
Putin,	  I	  believe	  it	  may	  have	  actually	  made	  the	  possibility	  of	  electoral	  removal	  more	  
likely,	  as	  Russians	  may	  have	  felt	  more	  confident	  about	  their	  country’s	  direction,	  
regardless	  of	  the	  particular	  party	  or	  person	  in	  power.	  This	  would	  depend	  in	  large	  
measure	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  personal	  credit	  Putin	  receives	  for	  successful	  policy	  actions	  
and	  the	  amount	  of	  blame	  for	  failures.	  If	  the	  Russian	  state	  is	  seen	  as	  strong	  and	  stable	  
without	  Putin	  being	  a	  specifically	  necessary	  component	  of	  that	  success,	  it	  could	  increase	  
the	  public	  perception	  that	  he	  is	  replaceable.	  
4. As	  was	  mentioned	  earlier,	  support	  for	  Yeltsin	  was	  not	  nearly	  as	  unified	  as	  it	  
would	  be	  for	  his	  successors.	  One	  important	  unifying	  value	  mentioned	  earlier	  is	  the	  
desire	  to	  back	  a	  winner.	  Unfortunately	  for	  the	  Yeltsin	  administration,	  the	  inability	  to	  
project	  itself	  as	  a	  winner	  in	  the	  confrontation	  with	  Chechnya	  actually	  united	  both	  the	  
Russian	  people	  and	  much	  of	  the	  military	  establishment	  against	  Yeltsin’s	  prosecution	  of	  
the	  war	  (Kumar	  1996:25).	  Putin’s	  higher	  levels	  of	  popularity	  and	  his	  ability	  to	  build	  
strong	  coalitions	  of	  support,	  combined	  of	  course	  with	  a	  more	  successful	  plan	  for	  
removing	  opposition	  forces	  in	  Chechnya,	  enhanced	  his	  ability	  to	  unite	  popular	  opinion	  in	  
directions	  conducive	  to	  his	  policy	  positions.	  By	  equating	  successful	  policy	  with	  personal	  
decisions,	  Putin	  solidified	  his	  hold	  on	  power.	  Public	  opinion	  was	  also	  mobilized	  much	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more	  strongly	  against	  the	  Chechens	  in	  the	  second	  war,	  with	  64%	  of	  all	  Russians	  wanting	  
every	  Chechen	  expelled	  from	  Russia	  following	  the	  apartment	  bombings	  in	  1999	  and	  
similar	  levels	  of	  support	  for	  bombing	  Chechen	  settlements	  (Russell	  2005:108).	  
5. As	  described	  in	  previous	  sections,	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐Chechen	  conflict	  
reach	  far	  into	  Russian	  history,	  and	  despite	  periodic	  success	  against	  Russian	  military	  
forces,	  Chechnya	  has	  always	  seemed	  like	  an	  easy	  target	  for	  suppression,	  subjugation,	  
and	  control.	  	  
The	  conflict	  in	  Chechnya	  seems	  to	  fit	  the	  necessary	  minimum	  criteria	  for	  successful	  use	  
of	  diversionary	  tension	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Russian	  government	  as	  well	  as	  enough	  of	  the	  criteria	  
for	  it	  to	  be	  a	  tempting	  option	  in	  some	  senses,	  but	  it’s	  hard	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  Russian	  
government	  purposefully	  keeps	  the	  Chechen	  conflict	  simmering	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  it	  flaring	  to	  
life	  at	  opportune	  moments	  (coincidental	  timing	  of	  the	  Second	  Chechen	  War	  with	  Putin’s	  bid	  for	  
presidency	  aside).	  The	  constant	  threat	  of	  terrorism	  and	  the	  toll	  taken	  on	  Russian	  political,	  
economic,	  and	  military	  institutions	  seems	  too	  high	  for	  the	  Chechen	  conflict	  to	  be	  a	  ploy	  by	  the	  
government	  to	  constrain	  or	  encourage	  public	  opinion	  in	  any	  particular	  way.	  Despite	  this	  fact,	  
there	  are	  conspiracy	  theorists	  who	  blame	  the	  Russian	  government	  for	  instigating	  both	  the	  
apartment	  bombings	  in	  1999	  and	  the	  Nord-­‐Ost	  siege	  in	  2002,	  both	  of	  which	  mobilized	  public	  
opinion	  even	  more	  strongly	  behind	  the	  Putin	  administration	  and	  against	  the	  Chechens	  (Russell	  
2005:108,112).	  The	  lack	  of	  corroborating	  evidence	  fairly	  convincingly	  removes	  the	  possibility	  of	  
these	  attacks	  being	  an	  attempt	  by	  Russian	  authorities	  to	  use	  the	  Chechen	  conflict	  as	  
diversionary	  tension.	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Instead,	  I	  suggest	  that	  a	  modified	  form	  of	  the	  diversionary	  tension	  theory	  may	  be	  
applicable	  to	  domestic	  as	  well	  as	  foreign	  policy.	  I	  see	  some	  evidence	  that	  Russia	  uses	  domestic	  
conflicts	  to	  affect	  international	  opinion	  in	  ways	  seen	  as	  conducive	  to	  Russian	  interests,	  just	  as	  
the	  traditional	  theory	  sees	  foreign	  policy	  affecting	  domestic	  opinion.	  The	  major	  difference	  
between	  this	  version	  of	  diversionary	  tension	  and	  the	  traditional	  form	  is	  of	  course	  that	  
traditionally,	  diversionary	  tension	  is	  planned,	  premeditated,	  and	  purposeful.	  The	  diversionary	  
measures	  that	  Russia	  has	  employed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Chechen	  conflict,	  conspiracy	  theories	  
aside,	  are	  more	  reactionary	  and	  opportunistic	  due	  to	  the	  unwanted	  and	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  
unexpected	  nature	  of	  the	  Chechen	  wars.	  One	  interesting	  event	  that	  has	  roots	  in	  both	  versions	  
of	  the	  theory	  is	  the	  terrorist	  attack	  in	  Beslan	  in	  2004.	  Though	  the	  attack	  fell	  into	  the	  category	  of	  
unwanted	  and	  unexpected	  attacks,	  it	  was	  still	  used	  to	  mobilize	  public	  opinion	  against	  the	  West,	  
as	  do	  the	  traditional	  diversionary	  tensions	  that	  Russia	  stirs	  up	  with	  foreign	  powers.	  In	  2004,	  
Putin	  blamed	  the	  attacks	  on	  Western	  support	  for	  the	  terrorists	  that	  attempted	  to	  weaken	  and	  
divide	  Russia	  (Trenin	  2009:12).	  
As	  pertains	  to	  my	  modified	  theory,	  one	  interesting	  phenomenon	  surrounding	  the	  
Chechen	  conflicts	  is	  the	  changing	  descriptions	  of	  the	  Chechen	  forces	  in	  the	  Western	  press.	  
During	  the	  first	  war,	  Western	  media	  sources	  spoke	  of	  ‘rebels,’	  ‘armed	  resistance,’	  and	  ‘freedom	  
fighters.’	  Attacks	  were	  not	  construed	  as	  terrorist	  acts.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  the	  second	  conflict,	  the	  
narrative	  had	  become	  almost	  entirely	  one	  of	  “Islamic	  terrorists”	  (Russell	  2005:102).	  Part	  of	  this	  
change	  could	  be	  due	  to	  Western	  focus	  on	  other	  matters	  in	  the	  early	  2000s,	  such	  as	  Afghanistan	  
and	  the	  Iraq	  War.	  At	  least	  part	  of	  the	  shifting	  narrative,	  however,	  is	  due	  to	  Putin’s	  successful	  
attempt	  to	  tie	  the	  Chechen	  conflict	  to	  the	  broader	  War	  on	  Terror.	  By	  describing	  operations	  in	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Chechnya	  as	  a	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  global	  War	  on	  Terror,	  Putin	  was	  able	  to	  create	  a	  sort	  of	  
‘moral	  equivalence’	  for	  the	  crackdowns	  on	  personal	  liberty	  undertaken	  in	  the	  Russian	  
Federation	  that	  linked	  such	  measures	  to	  similar	  actions	  within	  Western	  nations(Jack	  2004:272-­‐
3).	  Smoother	  relations	  between	  Russia	  and	  various	  international	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  EU,	  
the	  G8,	  and	  the	  WTO	  were	  now	  possible	  due	  to	  the	  new	  ‘lowest	  common	  denominator’	  
interests	  -­‐	  international	  terrorism	  and	  border	  control	  (Ibid.).	  In	  many	  ways,	  Putin	  was	  given	  
carte	  blanche	  to	  act	  as	  he	  wished	  in	  Chechnya	  without	  significant	  international	  outcry.	  
Conclusions	  
	   The	  traditional	  understanding	  of	  diversionary	  tension	  goes	  a	  long	  way	  in	  explaining	  
Russian	  behavior	  in	  Georgia	  as	  a	  proxy	  conflict	  with	  the	  West	  that	  unified	  the	  Russian	  
population	  and	  diverted	  attention	  from	  domestic	  problems	  and	  dissent.	  As	  applied	  to	  the	  
Chechen	  conflict,	  my	  modified	  version	  of	  diversionary	  tension	  theory	  hypothesizes	  that	  Russian	  
opportunism	  applies	  to	  domestic	  conflicts	  as	  well.	  I	  feel	  that	  in	  certain	  circumstances,	  
particularly	  during	  times	  of	  worldwide	  upheaval	  or	  stress,	  international	  relations	  can	  be	  
manipulated	  or	  controlled	  by	  careful	  application	  of	  narrative	  structures	  favorable	  to	  the	  Russian	  
position.	  Further	  analysis	  of	  Russian	  policy	  in	  other	  domestic	  conflicts	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  
test	  this	  theory	  and	  expand	  its	  scope.	  
	   The	  major	  weakness	  of	  this	  theory	  in	  explaining	  Russian	  policy	  is	  its	  lack	  of	  easy	  
applicability	  to	  non-­‐conflict	  events.	  Without	  further	  cases	  (which	  have	  not	  occurred	  in	  the	  post-­‐
Soviet	  policy	  decisions	  of	  the	  Russian	  government)	  of	  conflict,	  even	  strong	  evidence	  from	  the	  
Georgia	  conflict	  and	  potential	  application	  in	  Chechnya	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  make	  any	  conclusive	  
statements	  about	  diversionary	  tension’s	  role	  in	  Russian	  policy.	  While	  the	  evidence	  points	  to	  its	  
Pack 40 
direct	  role	  in	  Georgia	  and	  its	  possible	  opportunistic	  adoption	  in	  Chechnya,	  the	  existence	  of	  so	  
many	  other	  motivating	  factors	  shows	  that	  diversionary	  tension	  alone	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  
sufficient	  condition	  for	  instigating	  conflict.	  	  
Economic	  Enabling	  Theory	  
A	  major	  impetus	  behind	  conflicts	  across	  historical	  eras	  has	  been	  economic,	  whether	  in	  
pursuit	  of	  gain	  or	  avoidance	  of	  loss.	  While	  I	  doubt	  that	  economic	  factors	  alone	  are	  sufficient	  
conditions	  for	  most	  Russian	  interstate	  or	  internal	  conflicts,	  their	  influence	  should	  not	  be	  
discounted.	  Economic	  factors	  have	  been	  implicated	  in	  both	  the	  Chechen	  and	  Georgian	  conflicts,	  
with	  mercenary	  motivations	  present	  and	  salient	  for	  the	  Russian	  leadership	  in	  each	  case.	  The	  
relationship	  between	  economic	  factors	  and	  aggressive	  policy	  practices	  are	  not	  that	  simple,	  
however,	  as	  a	  certain	  minimal	  level	  of	  economic	  success	  can	  be	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  action	  as	  well	  
as	  an	  end	  goal.	  	  
A	  likely	  driving	  force	  in	  Russian	  policy	  is	  the	  cultural	  and	  political	  drive	  for	  Russian	  
primacy	  and	  importance	  on	  the	  global	  stage.	  There	  is	  evidence	  of	  a	  strong	  relationship	  between	  
those	  drives	  and	  economic	  prosperity.	  Putin	  himself	  has	  tied	  the	  idea	  of	  Russian	  primacy	  to	  
economic	  stability,	  describing	  Russia	  as	  both	  a	  former	  and	  future	  superpower	  whose	  
dominance	  will	  rely	  on	  economic	  successes	  (Jack	  2004:264).	  Russia’s	  economy	  is	  heavily	  reliant	  
on	  natural	  resources,	  and	  the	  new	  assertiveness	  in	  foreign	  policy	  coinciding	  with	  Putin’s	  rise	  to	  
power	  has	  been	  tied	  to	  the	  increasing	  oil	  and	  gas	  revenues	  of	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  21st	  
century	  (Ermarth	  2009:93).	  
	  As	  prosperity	  makes	  Russia	  more	  stable	  domestically,	  it	  tends	  to	  make	  the	  Russian	  
people	  more	  lenient	  toward	  the	  projection	  of	  Russian	  power	  abroad	  by	  the	  government.	  This	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could	  stem	  from	  the	  Russian	  pride	  in	  traditional	  culture	  and	  in	  Russia’s	  place	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  
that	  was	  referenced	  earlier.	  A	  stable	  economy	  builds	  trust	  in	  leadership	  that	  increases	  latitude	  
in	  policymaking.	  The	  increased	  revenue	  from	  a	  successful	  economy	  also	  allows	  for	  increased	  
military	  spending	  (Mankoff	  2009:32).	  Oil	  revenues	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  income	  are	  not	  only	  an	  
enabler	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  but	  also	  a	  tool.	  Recent	  applications	  in	  Ukraine	  and	  Georgia	  of	  what	  
has	  been	  termed	  “energy	  diplomacy”	  are	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  points	  of	  disagreement	  between	  
Russia	  and	  Western	  powers,	  particularly	  the	  United	  States	  (Tsygankov	  and	  Tarver-­‐Wahlquist	  
2009:309).	  
The	  scope	  of	  this	  paper	  does	  not	  allow	  a	  detailed	  breakdown	  of	  the	  various	  causes	  of	  
each	  conflict	  or	  an	  in-­‐depth	  look	  at	  the	  full	  economic	  indicators	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  and	  the	  corresponding	  policy	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  Yeltsin,	  Putin,	  and	  Medvedev	  
administrations.	  Instead,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  economic	  causes	  of	  war	  present	  in	  each	  conflict.	  I	  
will	  then	  examine	  policy	  examples	  that	  are	  either	  enabled	  or	  constrained	  by	  economic	  success,	  
including	  actions	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  lulls	  in	  fighting	  between	  the	  Chechen	  conflicts	  and	  the	  
buildup	  to	  the	  2008	  war	  in	  Georgia.	  
Chechnya	  
The	  ultimate	  cause	  of	  the	  first	  Chechen	  conflict	  is	  generally	  agreed	  to	  be	  the	  refusal	  of	  
Chechen	  leaders	  to	  sign	  any	  form	  of	  a	  federal	  or	  confederal	  treaty,	  and	  the	  proximate	  cause	  
and	  catalyst	  for	  direct	  intervention	  was	  the	  series	  of	  bus	  hijackings	  in	  1994	  (Lieven	  1998:84-­‐6).	  
Not	  insignificant	  in	  all	  of	  this,	  however,	  was	  the	  location	  of	  Chechnya	  atop	  Russia’s	  oil	  pipeline	  
from	  the	  Caspian	  Sea.	  Chechen	  oil	  production	  only	  accounted	  for	  1.5%	  of	  total	  Russian	  output	  
at	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  first	  war,	  but	  Chechnya’s	  location	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  Russia’s	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desire	  to	  control	  oil	  pipelines	  in	  the	  region	  (Kumar	  1996:24).	  Beyond	  future	  economic	  security,	  
analysts	  also	  believe	  that	  Yeltsin’s	  pursuit	  of	  a	  quick	  military	  victory	  in	  Chechnya	  was	  an	  
attempt	  to	  shore	  up	  his	  sagging	  popularity	  by	  distracting	  the	  population	  from	  the	  dismal	  
political	  and	  economic	  conditions	  at	  the	  time	  (Ibid.).	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  direct	  pursuit	  of	  
economic	  security	  was	  a	  stronger	  cause	  than	  the	  indirect	  attempt	  to	  alleviate	  negative	  
perceptions	  of	  current	  economic	  conditions,	  the	  economy	  played	  a	  role	  in	  Yeltsin’s	  decision	  to	  
intervene.	  
During	  the	  uneasy	  peace	  that	  existed	  between	  the	  cease-­‐fire	  in	  1996	  and	  the	  eruption	  
of	  the	  second	  war	  in	  1999,	  Russia	  suffered	  a	  massive	  financial	  collapse	  that	  led	  to	  a	  heavy	  
devaluation	  of	  the	  ruble.	  To	  understand	  how	  this	  affected	  popular	  opinion	  about	  economic	  
strategy,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  efforts	  at	  economic	  integration	  following	  the	  
collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  involved	  in	  large	  measure	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  state	  from	  direct	  
economic	  management	  (Robinson	  1999:535).	  Without	  reliable	  replacement	  enforcement	  
mechanisms	  in	  the	  economy,	  attempts	  at	  integration	  into	  the	  global	  economy,	  and	  with	  
Western	  Europe	  in	  particular,	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  market-­‐style	  economy	  as	  much	  as	  it	  did	  to	  
oligarchy.	  The	  move	  also	  left	  Russia’s	  economy	  vulnerable	  to	  shifts	  in	  global	  financial	  fortunes.	  
The	  combination	  of	  weak	  state	  involvement	  and	  instability	  in	  the	  global	  market	  were	  large	  
factors	  in	  the	  1998	  financial	  crisis	  (Ibid:533).	  There	  were	  many	  other	  factors	  involved	  in	  the	  
1998	  crisis,	  but	  one	  important	  effect	  that	  emerged	  was	  the	  revived	  feeling	  among	  Russians	  that	  
a	  strong	  hand	  was	  needed	  to	  stabilize	  and	  manage	  the	  economic	  situation	  to	  prevent	  another	  
collapse.	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As	  in	  the	  first	  war,	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  second	  Chechen	  conflict	  were	  only	  peripherally	  
economic.	  The	  direct	  causes	  were	  the	  Chechen	  invasion	  of	  Dagestan	  and	  the	  series	  of	  
apartment	  bombings	  referenced	  previously.	  These	  attacks	  gave	  Putin	  the	  domestic	  support	  he	  
needed	  to	  invade	  Chechnya	  once	  again	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  territorial	  stability.	  This	  support	  was	  
necessary,	  as	  the	  Russian	  people	  were	  not	  eager	  to	  become	  involved	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  after	  the	  
disastrous	  first	  conflict.	  There	  was	  still	  a	  prevailing	  anti-­‐Chechen	  sentiment	  among	  the	  Russian	  
population,	  but	  it	  was	  coupled	  with	  a	  strong	  desire	  to	  forget	  the	  first	  war	  (Jack	  2004:102).	  
Though	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  pipelines	  had	  been	  expanded	  since	  the	  breakup	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  
Chechnya	  was	  still	  of	  vital	  territorial	  interest	  for	  Russia’s	  economic	  fortunes	  in	  the	  region.	  
Russia	  also	  feared	  that	  the	  unrest	  in	  Chechnya	  preceded	  a	  more	  general	  upswing	  in	  Islamic	  
terrorism	  in	  the	  region,	  a	  specter	  that	  it	  raised	  within	  two	  years	  to	  tie	  its	  fortunes	  in	  with	  those	  
of	  the	  worldwide	  War	  on	  Terror	  (Ibid:	  272).	  
As	  was	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  Putin	  succeeded	  in	  tying	  Russian	  efforts	  in	  
Chechnya	  to	  a	  broader	  global	  effort.	  This	  allowed	  Russian	  leaders	  to	  negotiate	  with	  various	  
international	  monetary	  agencies,	  the	  G8,	  NATO,	  and	  other	  organizations	  in	  order	  to	  strengthen	  
its	  economic	  position.	  While	  Putin	  obviously	  had	  no	  foreknowledge	  of	  the	  events	  of	  9/11	  and	  
thus	  could	  not	  have	  started	  the	  Chechen	  conflict	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  improving	  international	  
economic	  ties,	  his	  potentially	  opportunistic	  use	  of	  the	  conflict	  to	  do	  just	  that	  shows	  the	  
importance	  of	  economic	  factors	  in	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  practices.	  The	  improved	  economic	  ties	  
coincided	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  international	  market	  prices	  for	  natural	  resources,	  and	  Russia’s	  
economic	  fortunes	  rose	  right	  alongside.	  The	  increased	  economic	  prosperity	  enabled	  greater	  
latitude	  in	  Chechnya	  as	  well	  as	  the	  burgeoning	  conflict	  with	  Georgia.	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Georgia	  
Before	  the	  Rose	  Revolution	  in	  2003,	  Russian-­‐Georgian	  relations	  had	  reached	  a	  post-­‐
Soviet	  nadir.	  Problems	  included	  Russia’s	  refusal	  to	  removed	  military	  bases	  from	  Georgian	  soil,	  
the	  distribution	  of	  Russian	  passports	  to	  Abkhazians	  and	  South	  Ossetians	  within	  Georgia,	  
Russia’s	  suspicions	  that	  Georgia	  was	  providing	  a	  safe	  haven	  for	  Chechen	  fighters	  in	  the	  Pankisi	  
Gorge,	  Georgian	  President	  Shevardnadze’s	  declaration	  of	  Georgia’s	  intent	  to	  join	  NATO,	  and	  
Georgia’s	  participation	  in	  the	  Baku-­‐Ceylon	  oil	  pipeline	  that	  would	  bypass	  Russia	  completely	  
(Tsygankov	  and	  Tarver-­‐Wahlquist	  2009:309).	  These	  problems	  tie	  in	  with	  many	  key	  Russian	  
values,	  including	  protection	  of	  “Russians”	  (by	  law,	  if	  not	  by	  ethnicity),	  worries	  about	  territorial	  
integrity,	  defection	  to	  the	  West,	  and	  loss	  of	  economic	  stability.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  focus	  
primarily	  on	  the	  economic	  factors	  at	  play	  between	  Russia	  and	  Georgia.	  
Relations	  seemed	  to	  improve	  after	  the	  Rose	  Revolution,	  with	  both	  sides	  appearing	  to	  
welcome	  the	  chance	  to	  move	  past	  previous	  conflicts	  and	  start	  anew.	  Much	  of	  Russia’s	  new	  
policy	  with	  Georgia	  in	  this	  period	  was	  aimed	  at	  strengthening	  economic	  ties.	  Russia	  increased	  
investment	  in	  Georgia	  helped	  restructure	  Georgian	  debt	  and	  also	  provided	  energy	  and	  
economic	  subsidies	  (Ibid:311).	  These	  actions,	  along	  with	  punitive	  Georgian	  action	  against	  
Chechen	  bases	  and	  Russian	  assistance	  in	  the	  uprising	  in	  Adjara,	  marked	  the	  high	  point	  of	  
Russian-­‐Georgian	  cooperation.	  All	  too	  soon,	  the	  continued	  reluctance	  on	  Russia’s	  part	  to	  
remove	  military	  bases	  within	  Georgia	  and	  Georgia’s	  determined	  push	  to	  join	  NATO	  and	  
crackdown	  in	  South	  Ossetia	  brought	  an	  end	  to	  this	  civil	  period	  (Ibid.).	  
Russia’s	  investment	  into	  Georgia’s	  economy	  was	  an	  example	  of	  a	  wider	  policy	  to	  use	  its	  
newfound	  economic	  success	  to	  influence	  politics	  in	  neighboring	  regions.	  Part	  of	  this	  strategy	  
Pack 45 
involves	  loans	  and	  investment,	  as	  in	  Georgia,	  to	  foster	  closer	  ties	  and	  interdependence	  
between	  Russia	  and	  its	  neighbors.	  Russia	  continues	  this	  policy	  even	  in	  the	  current	  economic	  
recession,	  having	  offered	  loans	  to	  Belarus,	  Mongolia,	  Armenia,	  Kyrgyzstan,	  and	  Ukraine	  (Trenin	  
2009:17).	  Though	  much	  more	  controversial	  internationally	  than	  loans,	  the	  withholding	  of	  
energy	  exports	  has	  also	  been	  used	  to	  increase	  Russia’s	  power	  and	  influence	  in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  
Central	  Asia,	  and	  beyond.	  	  
Russia’s	  role	  as	  a	  major	  supplier	  of	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  for	  many	  countries	  in	  Europe	  and	  
Asia	  gives	  it	  leverage	  in	  negotiating	  with	  those	  countries,	  leverage	  that	  Russia	  exploits	  in	  ways	  
that	  bring	  it	  into	  conflict	  with	  Western	  powers	  and	  neighboring	  countries	  alike.	  Before	  the	  Rose	  
Revolution,	  Russia	  imposed	  harsher	  power	  contract	  terms	  for	  Georgia	  than	  for	  other	  states	  in	  
an	  attempt	  to	  bring	  Georgian	  policy	  more	  in	  line	  with	  Russian	  interests	  (Jack	  2004:267).	  Similar	  
efforts	  have	  been	  undertaken	  since	  then	  in	  Ukraine,	  the	  Czech	  Republic,	  and	  the	  Baltic	  states,	  
among	  others.	  
Several	  countries	  adversely	  affected	  by	  Russia’s	  energy	  dominance	  attempted	  to	  
subvert	  that	  influence	  with	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Baku-­‐Ceylon	  pipeline,	  and	  Georgia	  joined	  
that	  effort	  to	  bring	  Caspian	  oil	  to	  the	  West	  without	  involving	  Russia	  (Asmus	  2010:9).	  To	  Russia,	  
this	  appeared	  as	  a	  move	  to	  threaten	  not	  only	  Russian	  economic	  stability,	  but	  also	  a	  sign	  of	  
Georgia’s	  increasing	  preference	  to	  look	  to	  the	  West	  rather	  than	  to	  Russia	  for	  its	  future	  
prosperity.	  Any	  increase	  in	  Georgian	  prosperity	  and	  success	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  Russia’s	  
role	  in	  the	  region	  (Ibid:217).	  The	  actual	  war	  in	  2008	  erupted	  from	  a	  multitude	  of	  causes,	  but	  the	  
long-­‐standing	  disagreements	  between	  Tblisi	  and	  Moscow	  evolved	  from	  Georgia’s	  desire	  to	  
integrate	  with	  the	  West	  both	  economically	  and	  politically,	  and	  Russia’s	  stubborn	  refusal	  to	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allow	  such	  a	  move.	  Disagreements	  and	  ethnic	  conflict	  in	  South	  Ossetia	  were	  the	  trigger	  for	  the	  
war,	  but	  the	  foundation	  was	  laid	  by	  the	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  nation’s	  
views	  of	  Georgia’s	  future	  (Ibid:216).	  
Conclusions	  
	   Economic	  issues	  have	  factored	  strongly	  into	  Russian	  decision	  making	  throughout	  its	  
history,	  but	  they	  have	  taken	  on	  a	  new	  importance	  in	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  world.	  No	  longer	  can	  
Russia	  hide	  its	  economic	  shortcomings	  while	  depending	  on	  mutually	  assured	  destruction	  and	  
arms	  buildup	  to	  remain	  relevant	  on	  the	  world	  stage.	  With	  the	  descent	  from	  superpower	  status	  
to	  existence	  as	  one	  moderately	  influential	  power	  among	  many,	  Russia	  must	  rely	  in	  large	  
measure	  on	  economic	  success	  to	  regain	  its	  place	  as	  a	  “Great	  Power”,	  it	  that	  is	  truly	  its	  goal.	  
Despite	  other	  avenues	  and	  investment	  projects,	  most	  of	  Russia’s	  resurgent	  economic	  strength	  
stems	  from	  reliance	  on	  natural	  resource	  exports.	  
	   Oil	  played	  a	  part	  in	  both	  the	  Chechen	  and	  Georgian	  conflicts,	  even	  if	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  
pipeline	  locations	  and	  control	  over	  oil	  production	  and	  sale	  to	  various	  interested	  nations	  on	  
Russia’s	  periphery	  and	  beyond.	  As	  has	  been	  demonstrated,	  however,	  economic	  reasons	  alone	  
do	  not	  explain	  Russia’s	  involvement	  in	  its	  post-­‐Soviet	  adventurism	  in	  the	  Caucasus.	  Like	  the	  
other	  theories	  studied	  in	  this	  paper,	  economic	  enabling	  explains	  some	  facets	  of	  Russian	  
behavior,	  but	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  fully	  testable	  set	  of	  conditions	  or	  motivations	  that	  could	  be	  used	  
to	  systematically	  examine	  Russian	  policymaking.	  
Overall	  Conclusions	  
	   With	  the	  exception	  of	  historical	  continuity,	  none	  of	  these	  theories	  attempt	  to	  explain	  
the	  whole	  of	  Russian	  decision	  making,	  even	  if	  only	  foreign	  policy	  is	  considered.	  Even	  historical	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continuity	  is	  a	  limited	  approach,	  as	  it	  by	  nature	  offers	  very	  weak	  predictive	  power	  as	  it	  draws	  
from	  the	  entire	  scope	  of	  hundreds	  of	  years	  of	  Russian	  history.	  Though	  each	  theory	  is	  limited	  in	  
its	  usefulness,	  using	  both	  a	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  conflict	  can	  improve	  our	  understanding	  of	  
each	  and	  the	  areas	  of	  policy	  to	  which	  they	  can	  be	  applied.	  The	  influence	  from	  each	  theory	  
points	  out	  the	  difficulty	  in	  pinning	  Russian	  behaviors	  easily	  on	  realist,	  constructivist,	  or	  other	  
simply	  qualified	  motivations.	  The	  interplay	  of	  historic,	  cultural,	  regional,	  ethnic,	  and	  other	  
factors	  precludes	  defining	  Russian	  policy	  with	  any	  one	  theory	  studied	  here,	  and	  potentially	  with	  
any	  one	  theory	  currently	  in	  existence.	  	  
	   Winston	  Churchill	  once	  said,	  “I	  cannot	  forecast	  to	  you	  the	  action	  of	  Russia.	  It	  is	  a	  riddle	  
wrapped	  in	  a	  mystery	  inside	  an	  enigma:	  but	  perhaps	  there	  is	  a	  key.	  That	  key	  is	  Russian	  national	  
interest.”	  Such	  a	  key	  is	  both	  elusive	  and	  changing.	  Theories	  may	  illuminate	  one	  or	  more	  facets	  
of	  that	  national	  interest,	  but	  when	  Russia	  itself	  seems	  unsure	  of	  its	  future,	  perhaps	  the	  best	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